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The Sovereign in Commerce
Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater*
Abstract. The federal government is increasingly a commercial actor, providing
retail services directly through its own agencies and indirectly through privatesector contractors. Government involvement with and in the private sector is
intended to capitalize on the expertise and efficiency of businesses, benefit taxpayers,
and promote public ends. Yet this involvement also confers advantages that benefit
the executive branch and its contractor allies at the expense of consumers and states.
Our prior work in these pages examined how a muddle of doctrines that form a
sovereign shield can be exploited by contractors and the executive branch to evade
civil liability and regulatory oversight. It tied the expansion of this sovereign shield
to the relative empowerment of the federal government at the expense of the states,
the executive branch at the expense of the legislative branch, and the private sector
at the expense of consumers. In developing a doctrinal response to the risks
identified, this Article draws on the insights of scholars who have studied federal–
state relations, contractor–agency relations, and business–consumer relations, and it
bridges the gaps between these literatures into which the sovereign-shield
phenomenon falls.
This Article argues that the solution to the sovereign-shield problem lies in
redefining the question. In determining whether an actor enjoys the sovereign
shield’s protection from liability and regulation, this Article proposes that the
analysis should turn on the nature of the activity performed, not the identity of the
actor performing it. If the activity is fundamentally commercial, the actor—whether
a government agency acting on its own or through its contractor—should not be
protected. This Article outlines a protocol for courts to implement such a proposal,
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drawing on well-established doctrines dating back to Supreme Court decisions from
the early nineteenth century. Shifting to this activity-based approach would help
preserve balances of power between states and the federal government, between the
executive and legislative branches, and between businesses and consumers.

1102

The Sovereign in Commerce
73 STAN. L. REV. 1101 (2021)

Table of Contents
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 1104
I.

Exploitation of the Sovereign Shield ........................................................................................... 1111

II.

The Challenge of Tactics That Fall Through the Cracks................................................. 1114
A. Federalism: The Feds (and Contractors) Versus the States .................................... 1118
B. Separation of Powers: The Executive Versus the Legislature and
Agencies Versus Oversight ...................................................................................................... 1122
C. Democracy: Business Versus Accountability ................................................................ 1124
D. Winners and Losers: Cascading Effects of the Expanded Sovereign Shield .... 1125

III. Brightening the Lines: Classifying Commercial Conduct ............................................... 1126
A. Defining “Commercial” ............................................................................................................. 1129
1. Sue-and-be-sued clauses .................................................................................................. 1133
2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ................................................................ 1136
3. The market-participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause ... 1139
B. A New Protocol .............................................................................................................................. 1142
1. Did Congress unambiguously preempt state law or provide
immunity for the challenged conduct?................................................................... 1143
2. Is the challenged conduct commercial? .................................................................. 1145
3. Who engaged in the challenged conduct?............................................................. 1146
4. If the actor is not the government, who is liable under traditional
agency law principles? ..................................................................................................... 1147
C. Returning to First Principles ................................................................................................. 1152
D. Applying the Protocol: Bright Lines and Grey Areas ............................................... 1155
1. Student Loan Servicing Alliance v. District of Columbia ....................................... 1156
2. Scott v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. ...................................................................................... 1158
3. Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. ......................................................... 1159
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................................. 1161

1103

The Sovereign in Commerce
73 STAN. L. REV. 1101 (2021)

Introduction
The federal government is a unique actor in the national economy. It
performs an astonishingly diverse array of activities,1 and at the same time it is
protected from liability and oversight by potent legal doctrines.2 This sovereign
shield—comprising the doctrines of federal preemption, sovereign immunity,
and intergovernmental immunity3—protects federal actors from civil liability
for a range of harms they may have caused.4
1. See Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, The Sovereign Shield, 73 STAN. L. REV.

969, 974-975, 975 nn.12-18 (2021) (discussing federal government activities performed
through contractors).
2. These protections, discussed in Part I below, stem from the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land . . . .”). While the sovereign-shield doctrines are not explicitly
enshrined in the Constitution, courts have traced the doctrines back to the Supremacy
Clause. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869) (“The [sovereign-immunity]
doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy; the inconvenience and danger which
would follow from any different rule. It is obvious that the public service would be
hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected
to suit at the instance of every citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and
disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government.
The exemption from direct suits is, therefore, without exception. This doctrine of the
common law is equally applicable to the supreme authority of the nation, the United
States.”); Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 46
(D.D.C. 2018) (discussing intergovernmental immunity and preemption).
3. There has been critique of, and pushback on, the application of each of these sovereignshield doctrines. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican
Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 714-18 (1991) (warning of the potential normative
drawbacks of federal preemption); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (describing criticisms of federal preemption); Vicki C. Jackson,
Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 522 (2003) (describing the unclear origin of federal sovereign
immunity and the “adverse effects of sovereign immunity on courts’ capacities to
provide individual justice”); David S. Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., 67 UCLA L. REV.
1130, 1197 (2020) (arguing that intergovernmental immunity for federal contractors
constitutes an unjustifiable “constitutional windfall”). We take no position on the
general need for governmental immunity. This Article instead seeks to identify a
doctrinal fix to the exploitation and abuse of the sovereign shield at the expense of
citizens in commercial contexts. Our proposal, in large part because it relies on
precedent that categorizes and assigns liability based on commercial actions, is limited
in scope and does not require wholesale abandonment of any of the sovereign-shield
doctrines. We take up noncommercial activities in future work. See Kate Sablosky
Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, Qualified Sovereignty (May 22, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
4. Some statutes explicitly waive sovereign immunity for certain actions. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491, 2671-2680. Although some of the activities covered by express
congressional sovereign-immunity waivers are commercial, statutory schemes create
numerous, far-reaching waiver exceptions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (exempting from
footnote continued on next page
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The protection afforded by the sovereign shield extends beyond the
federal government. As we have warned in our prior work, courts have
extended sovereign-shield protections to a wide array of private actors under
contract with the federal government. The result is that private actors receive
protection from both potential liability and mechanisms of legislative
oversight.5
Contractors have sought sovereign-shield protections in a wide array of
cases. For example, student-loan servicers under contract with the Department
of Education asserted preemption and intergovernmental-immunity defenses
to avoid liability and regulation under a local law designed to protect
borrowers from bad servicer behavior.6 A bank under contract with the
Department of the Treasury to issue cash cards to District of Columbia jurors
relied on sovereign-shield defenses to avoid liability when it allegedly charged
the jurors outrageous fees and failed to provide them full compensation.7 And
Department of Energy contractors asserted all three sovereign-shield theories
to defend themselves against allegations including willful, wanton, and grossly
negligent conduct in their management of enriched uranium.8 In each of these
cases, the court determined that, under certain factual conditions, the
contractor could be protected from liability by the sovereign shield.9
Businesses performing the same activities on their own would enjoy no
such privileged status. Further, as the federal government has increasingly

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

waiver “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused”).
Therefore, while amending or expanding sovereign-immunity waivers could operate
as a policy fix, doing so would require a significant legislative overhaul. Simply
including additional activities in statutes waiving sovereign immunity would not by
itself fix the problems we have identified.
See Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1032-46.
Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 36, 40-41, 46-47, 72-73.
Scott v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 296 F. Supp. 3d 98, 102-04, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2017).
Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 960-62 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
For additional examples beyond Student Loan Servicing Alliance, Scott, and Lamb, see
Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 974-975, 975 nn.12-18.
Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 65-66, 72 (finding that the District of
Columbia’s regulatory scheme ran afoul of congressional purpose and so was
preempted at least with respect to certain classes of federal student loans); Scott, 296 F.
Supp. 3d at 107-08 (describing the circumstances under which derivative sovereign
immunity would defeat the plaintiffs’ claims); Lamb, 835 F. Supp. at 965-68 (considering,
but ultimately rejecting, the defendant corporations’ “argu[ment] that nothing was
done at the plant without [Department of Energy] consent or approval and, therefore,
all activities at the plant would fall within the government’s discretionary function
immunity”).
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hired private businesses to fulfill its functions,10 the executive branch of the
federal government has developed closer relationships with those businesses.
This “alliance of Goliaths” confers benefits on both sides.11 Businesses get paid,
and they get to leverage their association with the executive branch in legal
conflicts with the legislative branch and state governments. Privatization and
outsourcing also benefit the executive branch by permitting it to advance
ideological aims12 and evade certain forms of oversight.13 In effect, private
businesses, in collaboration with the federal executive, increase their ability to
protect themselves from consumers both directly (by undermining civil
liability) and indirectly (by disempowering elected representatives in the
legislature).14 The result is the encroachment of self-interested private business
on our democracy and the expansion of federal executive authority at the
expense of Congress and the states.
This is the diagnosis of the problem, which we extensively examined in a
previous article published in these pages.15 But what is the solution? In some
instances, it makes sense to offer legal protection to government actors and
their private contractors because the federal government is acting in a
uniquely public fashion, providing a clear public good. In other cases, the
government—directly or through private contractors—provides a commercial
good or service. In these cases, it is less clear as a normative matter whether or
to what extent the sovereign shield should protect the government contractor
(or the government) from liability and oversight. This Article discusses both
where and how those lines should be drawn.
Although constitutional, administrative, and consumer law scholars have
all brought their expertise to bear on issues raised by privatization and
outsourcing, this Article explains why the phenomenon we identify has fallen
10. This phenomenon is well established. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 399 (2006) (describing the
increasing prevalence of federal contracting in government work).
Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1031-34.
Harvey B. Feigenbaum & Jeffrey R. Henig, The Political Underpinnings of Privatization: A
Typology, 46 WORLD POL. 185, 192 (1994) (stating that “[t]actical privatizations” are
undertaken to achieve the political goals of individuals or groups).
Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public
Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 21, 55 (1999) (noting
that “the diversification of the operations of government in this century has made it
harder for the public to find out what its government is doing”). In The Sovereign Shield,
we also identify at least one instance in which a contractor defied a legislative attempt
at oversight. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1028.
Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1032-46 (arguing that exploitation of the sovereign
shield both limits remedies for injured consumers and undermines oversight by the
states and the federal government).
See id.
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through the cracks in these bodies of scholarship. Scholars writing about
federalism have increasingly recognized the possibility for cooperation and
competition between states and the federal government, but they have not
delved deeply into the role that private businesses can have on the balance of
power between state and federal actors.16 Scholars analyzing relationships
between federal agencies and the private sector have identified myriad ways
that businesses and other federal agencies can affect federal regulatory policy,
but they have largely ignored the role that the states play as regulators and
policy drivers.17 And consumer law scholars have recognized the harmful
effects of businesses’ attempts to foreclose remedies for victims of corporate
wrongdoing, but they have not focused on this phenomenon’s implications for
federalism principles or democratic well-being.18
There is another problem. In determining whether to apply sovereignshield doctrines, courts have generally focused on the actor rather than on the
action taken.19 Scholars have criticized courts’ conventional focus on the
nature of the actor,20 writing that this approach is misguided because of the
considerable degree of intermingling and the blurring of lines between
government and business.21 In developing a doctrinal response to the
sovereign-shield problem, we draw on these scholars’ work and take up their
invitation to think in concrete terms about drawing a line between those
activities that should result in liability and those that may be conducted with
effective impunity. Like these scholars, we fear that the consequences of
permitting existing doctrinal confusion to persist are profound. Our fear is
especially pronounced given the staggering number and variety of services

16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. In the lawsuit over the regulatory regime established by the District of Columbia for

student-loan servicers, for example, the trial judge focused on whether the
government’s protection from liability extended to student-loan servicers based on
their status as federal contractors, not on whether the nature of the work performed
should result in the grant of such protection. See, e.g., Student Loan Servicing All. v.
District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 61-62, 73 (D.D.C. 2018).
20. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1371
(2003) (criticizing the current doctrine’s “emphasis on government involvement in the
specific act at issue [as] a very poor basis on which to rest such a distinction” between
acts that should be attributed to the government and those that should not).
21. Id. at 1370-71; see also PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT 6 (2007) (warning of risks arising because “[t]he relationship of
government to the private sector is very much in flux”); Jon D. Michaels, Sovereigns,
Shopkeepers, and the Separation of Powers, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 899-900 (2018)
(discussing and critiquing direct government market participation).
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that the federal government provides to the people of the United States, both
directly and through hired contractors.22
We suggest, then, that a shift in thinking is necessary to move toward a
resolution of the sovereign-shield problem. We argue that the problem does
not arise because the federal government relies increasingly on contractors
that assume a dual private–public character. Rather, we argue that the problem
arises because the federal government itself has assumed a dual character: It is
both a sovereign and a business. Put slightly differently, it is not about who is
doing the government’s work, but about what sort of work the government is
doing. Directly and indirectly the federal government is in the retail business.
Many of its services, like running recruiting campaigns,23 issuing loans,24 and
operating health care plans,25 are commercial in nature—meaning that entities
other than the federal government provide identical or very similar services
directly to consumers.
Thus, this Article proposes that the focus of judicial analysis of the
sovereign shield should shift from the relationship between the sovereign and
its contractor to the nature of the challenged action: If the action can be
classified as commercial, then the provider should not be treated as a federal
entity for liability purposes. While Congress could take up this shift through
statutory changes, doing so is not necessary. As we set out below, there is an
existing jurisprudential foundation that allows courts to make this doctrinal
shift without congressional attention or significant intervention from the
Supreme Court.
To be sure, changing the question does affect the answer. Accordingly, this
Article argues that even if a federal entity itself performs a commercial
activity, that entity should not benefit from anything less than express federal
legislative preemption, a finding of federal field preemption,26 or an explicit
congressional grant of immunity. At first glance, this may appear to be a
radical change from the current jurisprudence. Early Supreme Court cases
from the 1800s, however, recognize that a sovereign entity or instrumentality
can face different consequences when engaged in commercial activities.27 In
fact, in a string of cases, the Court recognized that a government entity could
22. We take no position on the normative desirability of outsourcing governmental

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

functions to private businesses. See infra Part I. This Article instead looks at the
exploitation of doctrines that protect the federal government and its contractor allies
and provides a protocol for reassessing liability for commercial harms.
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667 (2016).
Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d. 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2019).
N. Mich. Hosps., Inc. v. Health Net Fed. Servs., LLC, 344 F. App’x 731, 734 (3d Cir. 2009).
See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.
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not claim the special protections of the sovereign when it was engaged in
commercial actions.28 This thread has carried through various doctrinal
contexts.29 And it remains good law: In 2019, the Supreme Court recognized
the difference between commercial and noncommercial activity in construing
sovereign immunity’s extension to a federal instrumentality.30 Following our
proposal, courts could shrink the reach and power of the sovereign shield. This
would both preserve long-standing distributions of power and enable
consumers to obtain remedies for harms caused by the performance of a
commercial activity, whether the actor is the sovereign or its agent.
And this is a commonsense solution.31 When the government undertakes
noncommercial activity, directly or indirectly, such activity should be
presumptively entitled to relevant liability and regulatory immunity.
Furthermore, if Congress expressly preempts regulation of a specific
commercial activity or expressly affords the commercial actor immunity, such
activity should be entitled to relevant liability and regulatory immunity. By
contrast, when the government undertakes commercial activity—either
directly or indirectly—it should not be entitled to such extraordinary
protections. After all, even if the federal government itself performed all the
services now provided on its behalf by contractors, the sovereign shield should
not hamper or outright bar recovery by victims of nefarious or incompetent
actions that violate the law. When sovereign immunity, intergovernmental
immunity, or preemption has this preclusive effect, it matters little to the
victim seeking redress whether the federal government caused harm directly
or through a contractor. The result is the same: denial of a remedy.32
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 139 S. Ct. 1435, 1443 (2019).
31. Jon Michaels has suggested a similar approach, calling for designation of a contractor

as a “state actor . . . [based] on an actor’s tools, responsibilities, and outlook rather than
on what uniform she wears or whether she happens to be closely supervised by a
government official.” Michaels, supra note 21, at 899. We agree with Michaels insofar
as he does not prioritize the status of the contractor as a private entity, and we further
specify that what should be decisive is the nature of the service provided. We go on to
describe how such a mode of analysis could be made doctrinally operational. See infra
Part III.
32. In making these arguments we recognize that the viability of a public–private
distinction has come under considerable judicial and scholarly criticism, with some
suggesting that no line can consistently be drawn to divide these spheres of activity.
See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law,
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261, 263
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (arguing that the “distinction between
public and private . . . tends to conceal as much as it reveals of the complexities and
stakes in contemporary governance”). There is merit to this argument, which is why
we focus on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial, a distinction that
has been successfully deployed in other doctrinal contexts. See infra Parts III.A, .B.2.
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The discussion that follows has four Parts. Part I, which draws on
materials described more fully in our companion article, The Sovereign Shield,
defines the sovereign-shield phenomenon and delineates how federal
contractors may evade liability and oversight by exploiting the doctrines of
preemption, derivative sovereign immunity, and intergovernmental
immunity. It then illustrates how these three potent doctrines enable a
powerful alliance between the federal executive branch and its private
contractors, an alliance that risks shifting long-standing balances of power
between the states and the federal government, between the executive and the
legislative branches, and between consumers and businesses.
Part II situates the sovereign-shield phenomenon in the context of legal
scholarship that has explored agency–business relationships and federal–state
contests over legislative authority. This Part explores the difficulty of placing
sovereign-shield arguments into a single scholarly box. The assertion of
immunity to state-law claims implicates traditional federalism concerns; the
expansion of executive power through the use of contractors implicates
separation-of-powers concerns; and the state-law claims at issue arise under
consumer law, an area of law that the Constitution does not consider and
which typically goes unaddressed in critiques of rising corporate power. To lay
the groundwork for our proposal, then, we situate the sovereign-shield
problem across and between constitutional law, administrative law, and
consumer law and explain how the insights of scholars in each field aid in the
development of a solution.
Finally, Part III outlines the solution: a jurisprudential protocol, rooted in
existing law, for determining whether a challenged action should be entitled to
sovereign-shield protections regardless of the actor. That protocol rests on the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial conduct—a distinction
that courts regularly rely on in other well-established doctrinal areas,
including the assessment of the scope of sue-and-be-sued clauses, the
application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the application of
the market-participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause. Thus, we
argue that such a distinction is possible. With that foundation, we set out a
four-step decision tree that a reviewing court could use to evaluate whether an
injured party has an avenue for redress or is barred by the sovereign shield. We
further suggest that our protocol, and the theories on which it is based, is not
radical; rather, it reinforces a mode of analysis from early constitutional cases
recognizing that a single entity can perform different functions with different
repercussions.33 Revitalizing the analysis deployed in these early cases would
preserve essential balances of power and strengthen the legal and regulatory
mechanisms for holding federal contractors and the federal government alike
33. See infra Part III.C.
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liable for wrongful conduct. Part III offers three examples—taken from the case
examples set forth above34—to show how our protocol could be implemented.
I.

Exploitation of the Sovereign Shield

Our prior article, The Sovereign Shield, identified and analyzed the doctrinal
arguments that federal contractors have made in an attempt to evade liability
and oversight under state and federal law. Contractors try to avail themselves
of the sovereign shield, a barrier to liability and regulation based on one or
more of the following assertions: (1) federal preemption of state law;
(2) sovereign immunity derived from a contractual relationship with the
federal government; and (3) intergovernmental immunity, also dependent on
the relationship between the contractor and the federal government. For a
contractor, the precise choice of doctrine is of little consequence; contractors
simply seek to take advantage of the protection of “federal-ness.”35
Although the three sovereign-shield doctrines are ostensibly distinct, the
same core factors have figured into judicial analyses of whether the sovereign’s
protections flow to its contractor under each doctrine. Our prior work
identified five factors that courts generally use to determine whether federal
protections transfer to a nongovernmental actor. First, courts consider
congressional intent, asking whether lawmakers intended federal law to
displace state law or regulation in the context at issue.36 Second, courts
consider the character of the contracted institution, asking whether the entity
asserting a defense to liability was created by the government to serve a
national purpose and whether the entity is a federal instrumentality or agent.37
Third, courts consider whether the challenged conduct was discretionary,
asking whether the contractor had control over how a particular activity was
performed.38 Fourth, and relatedly, courts consider whether the contractor
exceeded its authority and went beyond the terms of the contract in
committing the harmful act.39 Finally, courts ask whether the state adversely
and impermissibly hampered a federal policy.40 Using a case study of student34. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
35. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1013-14. Indeed, the contractor may be successful

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

in the long run even if unsuccessful in blocking the claimant in a particular case. This
is because of the value gained from time spent on litigation and because assertions of
the sovereign shield can still be used in future cases to defeat claims. Id. at 1039-40.
Id. at 995-98.
Id. at 998-1001.
Id. at 1001-04.
Id. at 1004-07.
Id. at 1007-10.
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loan servicers under contract with the Department of Education to manage a
trillion-dollar loan portfolio, our previous article traced how federal
contractors, with the support of their executive branch partners, can move in
and between doctrinal defenses to expand the sovereign shield.41
Exploitation of the sovereign shield leads to previously unexplored
normative consequences that might get lost in the doctrinal weeds. First, by
limiting avenues of recovery, expansion of the sovereign shield tips the
balance between private industry and consumers in industry’s favor.42 When
contractors successfully use sovereign-shield doctrines to prevent or defeat
claims by consumers (or states acting to protect their constituents), the courts
deny consumers redress. The harms go unremedied. This is a profound
consequence not only for the affected consumer but also for other consumers
who remain vulnerable to the contractor’s future harmful conduct. Unless the
contracting entity chooses to exercise disciplinary power over the contractor,
there is no incentive for the contractor to change its behavior.
Second, by undermining state legislatures and state attorneys general,
sovereign-shield defenses shift the balance between states and the federal
government, destabilizing traditional federalism principles.43 If the sovereign
shield trumps state laws protecting consumers, then the states themselves are
effectively divested of their police power over that sector—a power that has
long been recognized as core to a state’s ability to protect its residents.44 State
attorneys general are effectively neutralized. So are state and local lawmakers,
who may otherwise attempt to oversee federal contractors’ conduct by
imposing regulatory regimes or to protect consumers by rearming attorneys
general with state-law causes of action.45
Third, by limiting accountability mechanisms to whatever happens to be
in the terms of a business’s contract with an executive agency, exploitation of
the sovereign shield chips away at the separation of powers.46 A private
business may argue that it is not subject to federal legislative oversight or, as
we have described, defy congressional demands entirely.47 To the extent that
the executive branch, by operating through private businesses, evades
41. Id. at 1010-32.
42. Id. at 1038-41.
43. Id. at 1041-43.
44. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 35-36 (2007) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) (observing that “[c]onsumer protection is quintessentially a ‘field which the
States have traditionally occupied’ ” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947))).
45. See, e.g., Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 41, 7576 (D.D.C. 2018).
46. Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1043-46.
47. See supra note 13.
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oversight by the legislature, that shift in power limits the accountability of
both the federal principal and the contractor agent.48 Without accountability
to lawmakers or courts, there is no remedy for past misconduct or incentive to
improve future behavior. Nongovernmental organizations, the institutions of
civil society that often provide an important check on government action that
might otherwise escape public notice, may similarly lack a means of
information gathering when the government acts through a contractor. For
example, the contractor might successfully assert that it is not subject to the
demands of the Freedom of Information Act49 or, if applicable, the procedural
requirements of other laws. Thus the executive branch, by acting indirectly,
may face fewer constraints than it would were its agencies to act directly. This
quiet power grab undermines democratic accountability.
Taken together, the subtle and dangerous effect of the expansive sovereign
shield is the corruption of democratic values, as the alliance between the
executive branch and its contracting partner results in de facto policymaking
without regard for other actors in civil society. When a private business
successfully deploys the sovereign shield, it protects itself and its agency
partner from consumers by both shutting down civil litigation and
disempowering the consumers’ elected representatives. And the greater the
degree of industry impunity in the conduct of business, the more power and
wealth private actors accumulate. The accumulation of power and wealth
enables private contractors to influence federal policy; without avenues for
private or legislative redress, this damages the well-being of the republic
because it may impede the government’s responsiveness to the needs of the
people.50
We do not take a position on the virtues or costs of outsourcing
government services to private businesses in general. We leave the debate
about the substantive merits of outsourcing to other scholars,51 and focus
instead on the repercussions of exploiting the sovereign shield—to individuals
in desperate need of a remedy, to the delicate balance between states and the
federal government, and to the encroachment of self-interested private
business on our democracy.
48. If the executive exercises oversight, this might be less of a problem. But when the

executive affirmatively advocates for insulation of the contractor, as in the case of
student-loan servicing, see Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1018-32, that should cause
more concern.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
50. This was the fear famously expressed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower speaking of
the risk posed to democracy by the rise of businesses serving the military, the
“military-industrial complex.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address 3
(Jan. 17, 1961), https://perma.cc/7K9X-Y2H5.
51. See, e.g., VERKUIL, supra note 21, at 2-6 (describing the dangers of outsourcing taken too
far).
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II. The Challenge of Tactics That Fall Through the Cracks
When federal contractors invoke the sovereign shield, they appeal to a
muddle of different doctrines.52 Because the sovereign shield implicates
federalism, separation of powers, and relations between businesses and
consumers, no extant body of literature addresses this phenomenon in all of its
dimensions. The problem necessarily falls through the cracks. But the
literatures on each aspect of the problem yield important insights that inform
our development of a comprehensive doctrinal response. This Part situates the
sovereign shield across these existing literatures, explains how the sovereign
shield’s implications can escape complete analysis within each body of
scholarship, and distills lessons from across subfields to fashion a proposed
solution.
Consider student-loan servicers, private companies hired by the
Department of Education to help manage its portfolio of federal student loans.
For several years, fourteen private companies collected and kept track of the
payments and balances of 36 million Americans who owed federal student-loan
debt.53 Borrowers interacted primarily with those servicers.54 Borrowers and
state attorneys general have filed numerous lawsuits against servicers for
violations of state and federal law,55 and both state and federal lawmakers have
attempted to assert authority to examine or regulate the servicers’ conduct.56
In their battle to (1) avoid potential liability to consumers under state and
federal law; (2) undermine state regulatory efforts; and (3) forestall federal
oversight, the servicers have pointed to their contractual relationships with
the Department of Education.57 This move implicates three areas of legal
scholarship.
When the servicer asserts that it is insulated from civil liability under state
law, it undermines the state’s police powers and implicates core concerns of
federalism: A federal actor, or an actor claiming to be federal, is challenging
state authority. This threatens to shift the balance of power between states and
the federal government, a phenomenon of great interest to federalism scholars.
52. Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 974.
53. See id. at 1017-18 nn.257-59. The Department of Education announced a change to this

54.
55.
56.
57.

structure in the summer of 2020. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of
Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid Announces New Contracts with Five
Companies to Improve Customer Service, Increase Accountability (June 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/T45P-L7KP.
Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1017-18.
Id. at 1011-13; see also id. at 1019 n.262 (listing sixteen complaints filed by individuals or
state attorneys general against student-loan servicers).
Id. at 1013 n.223 (listing statutes in eleven states and the District of Columbia aimed at
regulating student-loan servicers).
Id. at 1012-14.
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When the servicer declines to produce documents to or submit to
oversight by independent federal agencies or Congress, it also undermines the
authority and power of the federal legislature. This implicates separation-ofpowers concerns because the executive agency that hired the contractor may
frustrate duly enacted federal law, hinder legislative oversight, and evade
accountability. This phenomenon is of great interest to administrative law
scholars, who have called attention to the complex interactions between the
private sector and federal agencies.58
Finally, the servicer, a private company, is using its relationship with the
federal government to block a consumer’s effort to recover for an injury. As
the government and its contractors increasingly provide retail services, this
represents a shift in the power of the private sector relative to consumers. This
phenomenon is of great concern to consumer law scholars focused on the
foreclosure of redress to victims of harm caused by private actors.59
Multiple scholarly literatures, then, have touched on aspects of the
phenomenon that animates this project. Each has a distinct perspective and
offers rich insights on the consequences of federal contractors’ tactics to
undermine civil liability and regulation. Yet no literature addresses its
concerns or critiques to all of the actors who effect the shifts in power we have
identified—consumers, businesses, states, the federal executive branch, and
Congress.60 Consequently, the aggregate and system-wide effect of private
businesses’ doctrinal arguments has largely evaded analysis. To fill that
scholarly gap, this Article connects scholarly insights to show how federal
contractors’ exploitation of the sovereign shield achieves a deep shift of power
in favor of the federal government, and the executive branch in particular—a
58. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 719 (2010)

(arguing that contracting enables agencies to “achiev[e] distinct public policy goals
that—but for the pretext of technocratic outsourcing—would be impossible or much
more difficult to attain”); see also VERKUIL, supra note 21, at 6, 159 (describing the
changing “relationship of government to the private sector” and the greater
responsibilities of agencies when they direct contractors doing the government’s
work).
59. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1645-46, 1699 (2006) (describing the use
of transaction costs by sellers to extract rents from consumers and suggesting
regulation to address the tactic); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the
Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1504-05 (2009) (analyzing
trends in the availability of remedies for consumers and noting that the Supreme Court
has “limit[ed] significantly the ability of states to provide tort rights and remedies for
[their] citizens by preempting common law and statutory claims”).
60. Even this list, of course, omits the role of the Supreme Court, which is neither absent
nor neutral. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 16, 2008),
https://perma.cc/2MHM-GMBG (observing that “there are no economic populists on
the court, even on the liberal wing,” and that “ever since John Roberts was appointed
chief justice in 2005, the court has seemed only more receptive to business concerns”).
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result that both denies remedies to consumers and illuminates the continued
empowerment of business interests in and by our jurisprudence.61
This is not to claim that no aspect of the phenomenon analyzed in our
prior work has received scholarly notice; individual aspects have.62 After all,
the areas of scholarship implicated here are both broad and deep. Nonetheless,
the aggregate effects of the multiple trends enabling private business to deploy
the sovereign shield—trends including increasing privatization63 and rising
levels of political polarization64—may have received less attention precisely
because they do not fit neatly into a single scholarly category.
This conviction underlies the organization of this Part. A single law
review article cannot possibly do justice to the volume of scholarship on
federal–state relations, business–agency relations, or business–consumer
relations, let alone all three. Rather, this Part considers how the arguments
made by federal contractors cross boundaries within legal scholarship. The
Subparts below illustrate how this happens in three different contexts:
(1) federalism scholars’ understanding of the current state of federal–state
relationships; (2) administrative law’s treatment of outsourcing and the
separation of powers; and (3) consumer law’s analysis of the consequences of
the rising power of business. To ensure that our proposal does not ignore any
one set of risks created by the contractors’ arguments, we draw on the insights
of these bodies of scholarship for essential guidance in developing a workable,
doctrinal response to undesirable manipulation of the sovereign shield.
From this review, we distill a few lessons, which in turn contribute to and
shape our proposal in the next Part. First, and not surprisingly, in the context
of cooperative federalism, any reform must take into account the dynamics
61. This larger trend, a hallmark of the Roberts Court, has been recognized for more than

a decade, see id., but it has not been tied to the specific set of corporate defendants’
underlying doctrinal arguments motivating this Article.
62. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 1136-38 (focusing on federalism and warning of the
risk that, based on the Supremacy Clause, federal contracts may preempt state law and
federal immunity may inappropriately protect contractors); Craig Konnoth,
Privatization’s Preemptive Effects, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1937, 1943-44 (2021) (warning that
the federal government has enabled private contractors and other entities to displace
state law in ways that are the functional equivalents of preemption); Michaels, supra
note 21, at 862-64 (describing the ways that the federal government and states engage
in the commercial marketplace and identifying the difficult questions that arise as a
result of such government activities); Jon D. Michaels, Essay, We the Shareholders:
Government Market Participation in the Postliberal U.S. Political Economy, 120 COLUM. L.
REV. 465, 470 (2020) (“Government is repositioning itself as a savvy market participant
. . . using commercial rather than just sovereign levers to advance its various aims.”).
63. Verkuil, supra note 10, at 401 (writing in 2006 that “[p]rivatization has been part of
government management since the post World War II period, but its acceleration to
the limits of accountability is a relatively recent phenomenon” (footnote omitted)).
64. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1079-80 (2014).

1116

The Sovereign in Commerce
73 STAN. L. REV. 1101 (2021)

between the federal government, private-sector actors, and state governments,
and it should leverage rather than try to prevent conflicts between (or among)
them. More concretely, we recognize that state governments and the federal
government will continue to interact in different and likely novel ways, at
times cooperatively and at times combatively, and that no reform should aim
to prevent that outcome. Rather, any lasting reform must take advantage of
change by setting the terms of cooperation or combat, so that either form of
interaction does not result in an undesirable shift in the balance of power.
Second, and as a result, any reform must take into account its own
potential effects on inter- and intraparty relationships, including shifts in the
distribution of power within the federal sovereign as a result of changes in the
balance of power between the federal government and the states. For example,
relative empowerment of the federal government when it acts through or with
a contractor that evades accountability under state law also specifically
empowers the executive branch—the unit of the federal government that hires
the contractor and thereby may undermine the authority of the states—and
may insulate the contractor from federal oversight mechanisms like the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Third, and correspondingly, any reform should either restrict or eliminate
the ability of the executive to evade accountability under federal or state law
by using a private intermediary. If the federal government’s conduct is subject
to accountability regimes regardless of whether it is performed through a
contractor, then Congress and courts retain the ability to monitor and rein in
potential misconduct, preserving the balance of power both between the
executive and legislative branches and between the federal government and
the states.
This third observation leads to a fourth: Federal legislation alone may be
inadequate to the task of reform, not least because states’ police powers play a
critical role in constraining both the private sector and the federal
government. This in turn pushes us toward the doctrinal approach we adopt. It
would be difficult (and likely politically fraught) to address contractor liability
legislatively across the full range of activities that contractors perform and
regardless of the federal entities that hire them. To preserve the power of the
states, then, Congress would have to address the potential state-law liability of
both contractors and agencies across multiple specific contexts.65 This case-bycase approach is insufficient to effect broad change. Further, federal sovereign
immunity itself has its roots in doctrine;66 it is appropriate as well as pragmatic
to effect a remedy in the same context.

65. Perhaps excluding some, such as some forms of military contracting.
66. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 523 & n.5.
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Fifth, reform should blunt the potential effects of executive agency
capture by the private sector.
Finally, and fundamentally, because any effective reform must recognize
all of the players with stakes in the issue, reform must consistently pursue
consumer protection, recognizing the broader risk to the health of democracy
posed by the accumulation of private-sector power and influence.
A. Federalism: The Feds (and Contractors) Versus the States
The arguments made by federal contractors seeking to evade civil liability
implicate federal–state relations because the defendant contractors claim
protection based on their relationship with the federal government. That
relationship operates at the subconstitutional level: The Constitution scarcely
touches on the possible federal use of private contractors67 or the regulation of
the private sector more generally.68 In recent years, scholars have moved well
beyond early judicial analyses that viewed states and the federal government in
a binary relationship, assuming that each player clearly stood on opposite sides
of a conflict,69 and instead have offered a far more nuanced view of federal–
state relations.70 Scholars have identified federal–state partnerships that
achieve policy objectives in some contexts,71 analyzed the ways that states may
provide an arena for partisan conflict,72 and recognized that states may
67. VERKUIL, supra note 21, at 103 (observing that the “only reference in the Constitution

68.

69.
70.

71.

72.

arguably relevant to delegation to private parties is the Marque and Reprisal Clause,”
which “contemplated using ‘privateers’ to act for the government”).
The Supreme Court has addressed due process limits on the delegation of federal
authority. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936), the Court found that
federal legislation “delegat[ing] the power to fix maximum hours of labor” essentially
to large coal producers violated the Fifth Amendment. (The allocation calculation was
more complicated than this and rested on production and employment.) The effect was
to give “power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority” to the legislatively
empowered majority, and the Court found this to be “legislative delegation in its most
obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body,
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often
are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.” Id. at 311. The Court
concluded that the delegation was “clearly arbitrary, and . . . clearly a denial of rights
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id.
See, e.g., Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361-62 (1870).
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1700 (2017) (“These
days, neither the state nor the federal government presides over its own empire.
Instead, they govern shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space, sometimes
leaning on one another and sometimes deliberately jostling each other.”).
Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 663, 668-70 (2001) (describing the “rise of cooperative federalism” and
specifically identifying as examples of the phenomenon federal initiatives including
Aid to Families with Dependent Children and environmental protection).
Gerken, supra note 70, at 1696.
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themselves oppose or reinforce federal policy.73 Federal and state (and local)
actors engage in an elaborate dance, collaborating and challenging, endorsing
and subverting each other.74 These shifting relationships have consequences
for understanding traditional constitutional challenges such as the rights of
minority groups: The story is not simply one of a federal champion battling
states determined to engage in wrongdoing,75 or the other way around.76
From this more sophisticated understanding of how federal initiatives
work on the ground, we glean that asserting control over the expanding

73. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 64, at 1079-80 (describing the role of political partisanship in

driving states to challenge or support federal policy); see also Gerken, supra note 70, at
1712 (describing how the federal structure provides “different platforms and different
forms of advocacy for would-be dissenters”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Feature,
Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE
L.J. 2094, 2104 (2014) (describing a lawsuit by the federal government against the State
of Arizona attacking the State for “having made itself a ‘rival decisionmaker[] based on
disagreement with the focus and scope of federal enforcement’ ” (alteration in original)
(quoting Brief for the United States at 22, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
(No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048)).
74. Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,
1743-44 (2015); see also Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword:
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010) (“Scholars have moved
beyond states, but stopped with cities. They have thus neglected the special purpose
institutions (juries, school committees, zoning boards, local prosecutors’ offices, state
administrative agencies) that constitute states and cities.”).
75. Gerken, supra note 70, at 1708-12 (arguing that a contemporary theory of federalism
must incorporate the recognition that states and the federal government have an
intricate and dynamic relationship).
76. For example, in enforcing federal statutes, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) works closely with its state counterparts, engaging in “[c]opious negotiation . . .
during individual enforcement cases that arise within complex programs of
cooperative federalism.” Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 33-34
(2011). Ryan notes that federal–state interactions around environmental protection
take other forms too, including state participation in negotiated rulemaking under the
APA and cooperative programs like the Coastal Zone Management Act. Id. at 54, 59. In
the case of health care, scholars convincingly illustrate how “modern federalism”
involves federal law that “set[s] national baselines in the face of state regulatory failures
but still preserve[s] key roles for states as thought leaders.” Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole
Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1722 (2018). And
even in the context of immigration regulation, which the Supreme Court has
emphasized is a particularly federal undertaking, state and local governments are
critical, if doctrinally underappreciated, players. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 397, 415-16
(finding state laws preempted by the “pervasive[]” federal legislative regime governing
immigration); Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Federalism in the Weeds, 66 UCLA L.
REV. 1330, 1333-34 (2019) (observing that “states and localities play an increasingly
important role in shaping immigration policy” based in part on decentralized
enforcement discretion).
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sovereign shield requires recognizing that states and the federal government
do not always operate in clear opposition to, or as checks on, one another.77
A few scholars have pointed out a further complication: the power of the
terms of contracts themselves. David Rubenstein78 and Craig Konnoth79 have
warned that a contractor’s success in avoiding accountability may rest on
contractual terms, not solely on preemptive language in federal law.
Rubenstein describes how agencies can “preempt state law by incorporating
contractual terms by reference into binding regulations and orders.”80 When a
private business successfully relies on its contract to block the application of
state law, that means that an administrative agency, the federal entity that
hired the private business, may have on its own curtailed the power of the
states.81 Konnoth, meanwhile, warns that private actors may enjoy the power

77. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 177, 178-79 (2018)

78.
79.
80.
81.

(identifying the core idea of cooperative federalism as “overlap” between state and
federal authority and noting that this regulatory approach “has become an integral part
of American governance”). However, in an era of what seems to be ever more vitriolic
political partisanship, state governments have also become avatars of whatever
ideological group dominates within their borders, mounting challenges to federal laws
and policies pursued by the opposing party that dominates in Washington. See
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 64, at 1078-79. It may be tempting to tie these federal–state
challenges to the 2016 election and to think of states as the inevitable antagonists of a
federal behemoth, but that would be erroneous—although some news outlets have
reported that the Trump Administration faced more lawsuits brought by states than
any other administration in decades. See Natasha Bach, The Trump Administration Has
Been Sued More than Any Other Since 1982, FORTUNE (Aug. 30, 2019, 4:00 AM PDT),
https://perma.cc/V68B-DGLY (to locate, click “View the live page”). The Trump
Administration’s effort to restrict entry into the United States from several
predominantly Muslim countries certainly drew legal challenges by the states, see
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403-06 (2018), but so did the Obama-era Affordable
Care Act, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538-40 (2012). Before
that, so did the action of the Bush Administration’s EPA to avoid regulating emissions
that contribute to global warming. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510-11, 514
(2007). Conflicts may also run in the other direction when the federal government uses
litigation to attack state action. The Obama Administration, for example, sued to block
Arizona legislation that in part required state law-enforcement officers to investigate
the immigration status of a person stopped, detained, or arrested. Arizona, 567 U.S. at
393-94.
See Rubenstein, supra note 3.
See Konnoth, supra note 62.
Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 1167-68, 1176.
Id. at 1182 (explaining how state law may be blocked “because it conflict[s] with
contractual specifications agreed upon in an arms-length proprietary deal” between the
federal government and its contractor). This is the converse of the situation described
by scholars who believe that administrative agencies can aid the states in preserving
their spheres of authority. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J.
1933, 1985 (2008) (“In some cases . . . federal agency action is consistent with, rather than
footnote continued on next page
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to preempt state law based on judicial interpretation of their contracts.82 These
scholars have helped illuminate additional risks posed by the empowerment of
contractors, focusing primarily on cases of preemption attempted by the
government.
From this brief study of federal–state scholarship, two important guiding
principles emerge. First, it is a mistake to conceive of states and the federal
government as inevitable antagonists locked in an interminable, two-party
battle. This insight is critical in developing a solution to the sovereign-shield
problem: The challenge cannot be addressed by a simple reallocation of
responsibility to the states or to the federal government because the lines
between the two are blurred. Second, in many legal scholars’ explorations of
federal–state relations, other actors—like the private sector—operate like black
holes, invisible themselves but exerting force on the players whose behavior is
the subject of study. Accordingly, any solution to the sovereign-shield problem
must also account for and anticipate the effects of responses by these other
institutions. Business interests will exploit whatever opportunities a
reallocation of regulatory authority creates. Essential to this Article’s proposal,
then, is the recognition of the role of the private sector as an institution that
can affect the balance of power between the federal government and the states.
Just as the balance of power between the federal government and the states
may be affected by the private sector, the balance of power between the
executive and legislative branches may be affected by the states, because the
potential accretion of power to the executive occurs by means of weakening
the states. Thus “contests about the federal separation of powers are at the same
time cases about state power”83 and contests about state power are also cases
about the separation of powers.84 Any solution to the sovereign-shield
problem must be informed by the recognition of multiple interacting parties
with distinct and potentially overlapping roles. The next Subpart draws on
administrative law scholarship to develop this idea further and to draw
insights on the relationships between federal contractors and the agencies they
serve.

at odds with, federalism values—for example, where the agency is a better arena for
state influence than Congress alone.”).
82. Konnoth, supra note 62, at 1965-66 (noting that, in the context of the Federal
Arbitration Act, private firms “can choose . . . whether or not to include language in the
contract that displaces state law”).
83. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New Process
Federalism,” 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (2017).
84. See infra Part II.B.
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B. Separation of Powers: The Executive Versus the Legislature and
Agencies Versus Oversight
When a contractor invokes the sovereign shield to avoid oversight by
federal entities, including independent agencies85 and Congress,86 its actions
increase the relative power of its employer—an agency of the federal executive
branch. By acting through a contractor, the executive branch can hamper
oversight by its ostensibly coequal branch,87 the legislature. This is so because
the contractor can resist legislative oversight to which executive agencies
would have been subject had a private intermediary not been involved.88 In
this way, as the expanding sovereign shield confers benefits on a private actor,
it also implicates the separation of powers between two branches of the federal
government.89
The executive’s indirect conduct through private contractors evades
critique because the effect does not manifest in easily observable metrics such
as the cost, success, or failure of the program or activity that the contractor
performs. Such indirect conduct may have a significant impact on the relative
power of the federal executive. For example, Congress passed the APA90 to
control the processes by which agencies operate.91 If agencies can undermine
the APA by delegating their authority to private contractors, they can increase
the power of the executive relative to the legislature. It is that potential that
threatens the operation of the system of checks and balances intended by the
federal separation of powers.
85. As we described in The Sovereign Shield, the Department of Education instructed its

86.

87.

88.
89.

90.
91.

contractors not to comply with requests for information from the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, an independent agency with oversight authority over student
loans. Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1028.
Also discussed in The Sovereign Shield, the chief executive of the Pennsylvania Higher
Education Assistance Agency declined an invitation to testify at a congressional
hearing, citing the organization’s contractual relationship with the Department of
Education to avoid congressional oversight. Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1043-46; see also David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 393, 457 (2008) (describing how reliance on contractors can reduce the
effectiveness of transparency measures like those created by the Freedom of
Information Act).
See supra notes 49, 87 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I. Further, because the application of the shield would lead a court to
decline further proceedings, both the court—the third branch—and, of course, the
plaintiff would be unable to hold the contractor accountable.
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux —The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (2017) (describing the origins of
the APA).
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The prospect of an alliance between regulator and regulated grows more
likely when their respective leaders share common values, a possibility that
administrative law scholars have also explored. While “capture” is traditionally
and narrowly understood to occur when a regulator favors industry out of
“material self-interest,”92 industry preferences may affect agency conduct in
different ways. Some ties are more obvious, such as when an agency depends
on fees paid by its regulated industry or when agency employees anticipate
future jobs in the private sector, while others are subtle, such as when
regulators and industry actors share “ideological beliefs.”93 Businesses may
influence regulators’ perspectives and thereby shape their values and goals, a
process that James Kwak has called “cultural capture.”94
But there’s more. While administrative law scholars offer critical insights
on how privatization can enable the expansion of executive power, thereby
threatening the separation of powers, few have looked at the potential ability
of state law and regulation to act as counterweights to executive action.95 In
addition to recognizing the compound risk of executive aggrandizement at the
expense of the legislature and at the expense of the states, analyzing
privatization and outsourcing from a multifaceted, separation-of-powers
perspective yields three lessons critical to effective doctrinal reform.
First, the potential influence of informal relationships between agency and
contractor suggests that blunt prohibitions on ties between the regulator and
the regulated are unlikely in themselves to protect the public interest. Some
other mechanism—one that does not turn on separating agency officials from

92. James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY

CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71, 75 (Daniel Carpenter
& David A. Moss eds., 2014).
93. Id. at 75-76.
94. Id. at 78-79. Kwak describes, for example, an event as seemingly innocuous as an
informal briefing where Department of the Treasury officials offered chocolate chip
cookies to outside bloggers. At least one person described the event as leading to more
sympathy for the Department’s position. Kwak uses the vignette to illustrate a broader
phenomenon: how even modest industry events can affect agency employees’
sympathies. Id. at 89.
95. But see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 461 (2012) (observing that although “commentators have advanced
proposals to check executive power and restore competition, they have largely
overlooked one powerful actor: the states”). Bulman-Pozen goes on to analyze the ways
in which state action can affect (and enforce) the separation of powers. Id. at 492-93
(explaining how “[c]oncurrent delegation to state and federal agents . . . may safeguard
the separation of powers not only by pushing states and their federal executive
counterparts to focus attention on Congress, but also by making it more likely that the
other two branches of the federal government will check the federal executive” (emphasis
added)).
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business executives or on general good intentions within the agency—is
needed.
Second, although subjecting federal contractors to the requirements of the
APA would help rebalance power between the executive and Congress, it
would not comprehensively engage with the full range of ways in which
businesses and the executive exploit the sovereign shield. Contractors would
still point to their relationship with the federal sovereign to avoid liability
under state law.
These two observations suggest a third: Attempting to rein in contractors
through federal legislation may be inadequate to preserve the balance of power
between the branches and between the federal government and the states.
Rather, the ideal response should ensure both accountability of the executive
to the legislature and accountability of the private sector to the federal
government and the states—all of which are goals of our proposal.
C. Democracy: Business Versus Accountability
Consumer law scholars have long studied efforts by businesses to evade
mechanisms that enable those harmed by their conduct to recover. One prime
example is the now-ubiquitous mandatory arbitration clause, which attaches
terms to the sale of a product or service that preclude customers from recovery
through litigation.96 Consumer law scholars have analyzed the phenomenon of
mandatory arbitration clauses as one piece of a larger movement by businesses
to prevent civil litigation and access to civil justice.97 This recognition of
businesses’ efforts to sidetrack, undermine, or prohibit redress for injured
consumers has focused on the same concern that animates our work: the denial
of a remedy to victims who deserve compensation.98
96. This is achieved through the imposition of mandatory arbitration clauses in sales

agreements for ubiquitous products, such as mobile-phone services, with conditions
that undermine the availability of a civil remedy. For example, in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011), a majority of the Supreme Court held that a
California state law preserving class-action lawsuits by mobile-phone-service
customers was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, a ruling that effectively
precluded recovery because an individual action was not financially viable, see id. at 365
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 323
(2013) (criticizing the judicial endorsement of arguments in favor of arbitration that
have the effect of leaving “people . . . remediless, [and] leaving the challenged conduct
undeterred”).
98. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 133
(2011) (criticizing the development of doctrine that gives businesses “the power to
impose a mandatory, no-opt-out system in their own private ‘courts’ designed to
preclude aggregate litigation”).
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The implications of increasing business impunity through expansion of
the sovereign shield, however, extend much further. Indeed, to fully develop a
doctrinal fix to the sovereign-shield problem, we cannot stop with the insights
of consumer law scholars interested in the relationship between businesses and
consumers. We must also draw on insights from those scholars concerned with
the threat posed to broader democratic values by the private sector’s
accumulation of power. Legal scholars writing on diverse doctrines, from
freedom of speech to voting rights, have warned of the risks that increasing
inequality and private wealth in general, and increasing business wealth and
influence in particular, pose to the health of democracy.99 The private sector’s
invocation of the sovereign shield enables businesses to avoid liability and
increase profits—profits they may then use to influence law, regulation, and
policy in their favor. Thus, successful exploitation of the sovereign shield
further reinforces the private sector’s existing wealth and influence.100
D. Winners and Losers: Cascading Effects of the Expanded Sovereign
Shield
The distinct dangers of an overexpansive sovereign shield identified by
scholars in each of these areas of law do not manifest in isolation but in
concert. The relative empowerment of the federal government at the expense
of the states simultaneously empowers the executive branch relative to the
legislature by enabling agencies that act through contractor proxies to evade
congressional oversight. At the same time, the protection obtained by the
private sector stymies the states—and individual consumers—seeking to use
state law to protect themselves and to hold either the contractor or the federal
government accountable. Increased power and influence of private-sector
actors in turn bolsters the power of their agency allies—a phenomenon that
Jon Michaels has recognized as a “constitutional challenge[]” of
privatization.101 This combination of effects makes clear the compound risk:
99. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME

COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 5 (2016) (warning that the
“central problem of money in politics is . . . a system in which economic inequalities,
inevitable in a free market economy, are transformed into political inequalities that
affect both electoral and legislative outcomes”).
100. In this vein, it is worth recalling the oft-quoted speech of President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, see Eisenhower, supra note 50, at 3, in which he warned of the threat to
democracy posed by a “military-industrial complex.” Eisenhower warned of the risk
posed by a large and growing arms-manufacturing industry, but any federal
government contractor may present a similar threat, with industry sectors wielding
“economic, political, even spiritual” power. Id.
101. Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 572
(2015) (situating privatization in the context of ongoing battles between “power and
constraint,” and warning of the constitutional risk of the “fusion of state and
footnote continued on next page
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that the executive might elect to use a contractor to perform a service precisely
because doing so enables an end run around oversight by Congress and by the
states. And the private businesses accumulating wealth and influence can in
turn wield their increasing power to shape substantive law and regulation in
their favor, at the expense of the public interest and democracy itself.
None of this is to argue that federal outsourcing is per se normatively
undesirable, or to suggest that doctrinally limiting the scope of the sovereign
shield will solve the problem of money in politics. But consideration of these
larger concerns about national democratic health does make clear what is at
stake when attributes of the federal government benefit private businesses.
Taken together, the diverse and complex bodies of legal scholarship above
offer insights and lessons necessary to devise a doctrinal response to
exploitation of the sovereign shield. Not only do these conflicts—federal–state,
executive–legislative, business–consumer, and business–democracy—undercut
access to justice through individual and collective action, but they also
undercut principles of federalism and separation of powers. But even that is not
the end. Scholars interested in democratic health implore us to understand the
ways in which businesses’ accumulation of financial power enables corrosion
of politics. We draw inspiration from each of these subdisciplines as we
develop a proposed doctrinal fix.
III. Brightening the Lines: Classifying Commercial Conduct
We have already shown the difficulty and danger in persisting with the
current sovereign-shield doctrinal morass.102 There are some seemingly
obvious doctrinal reform proposals.
One might suggest, for example, that the sovereign shield should stop at
the government’s door. In other words, private entities, regardless of their
relationship with the sovereign, should never be entitled to sovereign shield
protections. But that is too blunt a tool; contractors may perform functions on
behalf of the sovereign that merit protection.
Or one might think that sovereign-shield defenses should not apply at all,
to either private businesses or the federal government. Federal sovereign
immunity, for example, has a questionable constitutional origin,103 is hotly

commercial power”); id. at 582 (describing the incentive for federal contractors to
“support . . . agency leaders”).
102. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1032-46.
103. Jackson, supra note 3, at 522 (“[T]he constitutional provenance of federal ‘sovereign
immunity’ is obscure, and was a matter of genuine uncertainty in early years.”). Federal
sovereign immunity was not explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court until 1821.
See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and
footnote continued on next page
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contested,104 and has been studied far less than other forms of sovereign
immunity.105 But eliminating federal sovereign immunity is at once an
overbroad and underinclusive response to abuse of the sovereign shield. Doing
so responds only to derivative immunity, leaving preemption as a possible
mechanism to forestall liability and oversight. Further, because Congress
retains the right to explicitly immunize government agencies and their
corporate agents,106 it could easily legislate federal sovereign immunity back
into existence.107 Abolition of federal sovereign immunity also runs counter to
the Supremacy Clause.108
Yet another possibility is—in an effort to increase efficiency and take
advantage of the innovations of the private sector—extending the sovereign
shield to protect all government contractors and agents simply because of their
relationship with the sovereign.109 However, this would leave consumers and

104.
105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765,
776-77 (2008).
See Jackson, supra note 3, at 538 n.73.
See Florey, supra note 103, at 776 (noting that federal sovereign immunity “has been
described as a ‘ghost[] . . . haunt[ing] the early Republic’ and one of ‘the greatest
mysteries’ in American law” (second and third alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(first quoting Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative
Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1998); and
then quoting Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About the
Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned From King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 395 (2005))).
Currently, federal agencies and their instrumentalities enjoy sovereign immunity in
the absence of congressional action to waive that immunity. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518
U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (noting that a “waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text”). Accordingly, Congress
also has the power to recognize or grant such immunity expressly by statute.
Although our protocol, see infra Part III.B, is also subject to this criticism—that
Congress could legislate away a commercial–noncommercial line by explicitly
immunizing or preempting commercial conduct—such conduct would need to be
undertaken out in the open. Part of our concern about the sovereign shield is that it
usurps power in quiet and sly ways. We suspect that the political will and drive to
immunize federal actors generally would be stronger than the political will and drive to
exempt commercial conduct from liability and oversight.
See Florey, supra note 103, at 771-73 (describing the history and purpose of sovereign
immunity); Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors
Share the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 197-201
(1997) (defining sovereign immunity’s objectives and rationales).
See, e.g., Paul Taylor, We’re All in This Together: Extending Sovereign Immunity to
Encourage Private Parties to Reduce Public Risk, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1595, 1646-47 (2007).
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states without any recourse for harmful or illegal activity110 and incentivize
potentially dangerous risk-taking by the contractor.111
This Article suggests that the solution lies in a new—or, really, an old—
frame.112 Rather than placing the identity of the actor at the center of the
inquiry, asking whether that actor is effectively the federal government, courts
should focus on the nature of the activity to determine the appropriate degree
(if any) of insulation from liability and oversight. If the challenged conduct is
commercial, it should not be covered by sovereign-shield defenses regardless of
the actor. If the challenged conduct is not commercial, government-directed
conduct should be presumptively covered by sovereign-shield defenses. In both
cases, traditional agency principles are sufficient to allocate liability between
the government/principal and the contractor/agent.113 This is not to say that
the analysis will be easy or straightforward; it is simply to assert that agency
law, which is well-developed and familiar to courts, provides a consistent
framework for analysis. One implication of this proposal is that the federal
government itself, when acting in a commercial capacity, would be subject to
suit, unprotected by the sovereign shield.114
This Part proceeds as follows. It first identifies other doctrinal areas in
which Congress and the courts have separated commercial conduct from
noncommercial conduct in assessing jurisdiction or liability.115 It does so for
two reasons: (1) to show that drawing such a distinction is, in fact, possible; and
110. Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 973.
111. See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 399-402, 466-67 (arguing that the risk of unaccountable

112.
113.
114.

115.

contractors means that to protect public values, “some functions” must be put “beyond
the reach of privatization”).
See infra Part III.C.
For a full explanation, see Part III.B below.
This implication is not as audacious as it might first appear. In fact, both Congress and
the courts have recognized this possibility in other areas and in early constitutional
analysis. See infra Parts III.A, .C; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691-92 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
sovereign immunity may need to be scaled back because historically “[s]overeigns did
not . . . play the kind of role in the commercial marketplace that they do today”).
There is a significant debate over whether the sovereign-shield defenses are
jurisdictional defenses. Compare Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888
F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that the Yearsley doctrine, which recognizes limited
immunity when the government validly authorizes a contractor’s conduct, “operates as
a jurisdictional bar to suit and not as a merits defense to liability”), with Adkisson v.
Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 790 F.3d 641, 646-47 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that a Yearsley
defense would not be a jurisdictional question). This, of course, affects the moment in
the litigation when the defense can be offered, the amount of information available to
rebut the defense, and general access-to-justice concerns. We recognize the debate but
need not enter this specific fray. In fact, under this Article’s proposal, the commercial
nature of the challenged activity is a first-cut question and would resolve the access-tojustice issue for many consumers.
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(2) to identify factors that the legislature and the judiciary have used to
distinguish commercial and noncommercial activity in contexts that do not
involve the doctrines that make up the sovereign shield. We then turn to this
Article’s proposed protocol, a method for determining the availability of
sovereign-shield doctrines. Next, we situate our proposal in historical context
to address the critique that adopting the proposal would constitute too extreme
a break with precedent. We show that holding actors—government or
private—accountable for commercial actions that violate state or federal law is,
in fact, a return to first principles expressed by the Supreme Court nearly two
centuries ago. Finally, this Part outlines how the proposal could be
implemented, sketching three case studies for drawing the lines between
commercial and noncommercial activity and operationalizing our protocol.
We do not suggest that application of the protocol would always be clear
or well-defined; complex legal analysis never is. There will be tough cases and
hard-fought litigation battles. But we offer some examples to make the
proposal concrete and to illustrate the advantages of our approach relative to
current practice.
A. Defining “Commercial”
The government has a long and storied history of working with and in the
private sector.116 Obvious early examples include the First and Second Banks
of the United States, in which the federal government was a shareholder.117
The government later purchased corporate assets necessary to facilitate
construction of the Panama Canal in 1902.118 Government involvement in
business swelled during World War I and the Great Depression, with the
advent of, among others, the United States Grain Corporation, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.119 Indeed, “a few corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), brought the Government into the commercial sale of goods

116. See, e.g., Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 506 (1950) (describing the

“fundamental policy of the Government to refrain, as much as possible, from doing its
own manufacturing and to use, as much as possible (in the production of munitions),
the experience in mass production and the genius for organization that had made
American industry outstanding in the world”), superseded by statute, Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 401, 80 Stat. 830, 841-42 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S.
381, 389 (1939) (“For more than a hundred years corporations have been used as
agencies for doing work of the government.”).
117. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1995).
118. Id. at 387.
119. Id. at 388.
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and services.”120 In the 1960s the government adopted a new approach,
“sponsoring corporations that it specifically designated not to be agencies or
establishments of the United States Government . . . with the purpose of
entering the private sector, but doing so with Government-conferred
advantages.”121
Questions inevitably arose about the potential liability of public–private
entities, forcing courts to engage in precisely the kind of analysis that we
describe in more detail below. Anne Joseph O’Connell explores these hybrid
“boundary organizations”—organizations that exist at the border between the
federal government and the private sector,122 between the federal government
and another sovereign entity (such as a state, foreign government, or tribal
government),123 or between the branches of the federal government. 124
O’Connell divides such organizations into purely governmental
organizations—including federal corporations—and quasi-governmental
agencies.125 Quasi-government boundary organizations include the United
States Postal Service (USPS), Amtrak, the Smithsonian, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the National Park Foundation, and the
National Academy of Sciences.126 Although O’Connell recognizes both
potential benefits and drawbacks of boundary organizations, she unequivocally
finds inconsistency and lack of clarity in defining them, their power and
authority, and the legal doctrines surrounding them.127 She joins other
administrative law scholars in acknowledging the difficulty for courts in
distinguishing what is public from what is private.128
This scholarly debate over traditional governmental (or public) actions
and nontraditional governmental (or private) actions continues to rage.129
120. Id.
121. Id. at 390.
122. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 855-61

(2014).
123. Id. at 861-65.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 865-70.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856-60.
Id. at 849-51 (explaining the lack of definition and categorization for, and the
underestimation of the powers of, boundary organizations); id. at 888-92 (discussing
benefits and drawbacks); id. at 894-96 (explaining the lack of clarity in applying legal
definitions and obligations); see also Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,
378 (1995) (recognizing that the Court’s cases “deciding when private action might be
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency” (quoting Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting))).
128. O’Connell, supra note 122, at 906-10; see also supra note 32.
129. See supra note 32.
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Some scholars have argued that the public–private distinction has collapsed
altogether,130 and at least some Supreme Court Justices agree.131 So do we. We
suggest, however, that the difficulty arises not in the analysis phase, but in the
framing of the issue to be resolved. The lack of clarity reflects not the
impossibility of determining when the special attributes of the sovereign
should attach in general, but only the impossibility of doing so when the
identity of the actor is viewed as the dispositive element of the doctrinal test.
Whether a particular activity is quintessentially (or traditionally, or
inherently) public or governmental may be intractable, but whether that
activity is commercial in nature—even if performed for a public purpose—is
more easily answered within our doctrinal tradition.132
Although the relationship between the public and the private sector is
complex and has changed over the course of our nation’s history, the
legislature and the judiciary have long distinguished commercial from
noncommercial activities. One might imagine that the most obvious place to
begin this discussion is with the constraints on what the federal government
can truly privatize: the nondelegation doctrine133 and the state-action
doctrine.134 Although these doctrines are helpful in that they reinforce the

130. See supra note 32.
131. See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,

358 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The public-private distinction drawn by the Court is
both illusory and without precedent.”); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 422
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since . . . I see no sense in the public-private distinction,
neither do I see what precisely it consists of.”); see also Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (acknowledging that the
Supreme Court has not “definitively explained” the difference between public rights
and private rights (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 69 (1982) (plurality opinion))).
132. See infra Part III.C.
133. The nondelegation doctrine recognizes that there are certain activities that are
uniquely within the domain of the state or a particular branch of government and
cannot be delegated. The Constitution’s structure imposes this requirement by
allocating distinct responsibilities to each branch. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 1; id. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1. Federal law imposes limits on subdelegation by the executive, see
3 U.S.C. §§ 301-302, and Supreme Court decisions have recognized the principle. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am.
R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231-34 (2015) (finding that because Amtrak was a governmental
entity—notwithstanding Congress’s language to the contrary—its federally delegated
regulatory authority did not necessarily violate nondelegation principles).
134. The state-action doctrine considers whether the conduct of a nongovernmental entity
constitutes state action for the purpose of constitutional rights and responsibilities—
for example, the First Amendment, see Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.
Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019), or the Fourteenth Amendment, see Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974). The Court asks whether the defendant entity exercises a
function “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. If a
footnote continued on next page
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notion that the Court has the capacity to examine and classify the conduct of
private businesses, both the nondelegation and state-action doctrines hew
closely to the public–private line, relying on a distinction that has proved
unstable, and thus less useful, in the assessment of particular contractor
conduct.135
Rather, it is in other contexts—analyzing sue-and-be-sued clauses,
applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and distilling the boundaries
of the market-participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause—that
Congress and courts have successfully grappled with the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial activity. Although each of these doctrines
offers slightly different contours, together they teach us that (1) drawing a
distinction along a commercial–noncommercial axis is possible; and (2) there
are factors that we can borrow to identify commercial conduct, which we build
directly into our protocol. We do not fully adopt any doctrinal analysis into
our proposal, but instead we look to these doctrinal areas for both evidence and
guidance. Collectively, these doctrines emphasize five factors that distinguish
an activity as essentially commercial: (1) the existence of private competition;
(2) direct interaction with the public; (3) any history of public performance of
the activity; (4) the possibility of undertaking the activity in an individual’s
name; and (5) the entity’s susceptibility to market pressures and conditions. It is
those factors, and the analysis and theories that underlie them, that offer a
scaffolding for developing the definition of commercial activity in our
protocol.
Focusing on commercial activities will not solve all potential abuses of the
sovereign shield. It will do nothing about privately operated immigration
detention centers or private prisons, for example, because these activities are
unlikely to be deemed commercial.136 Our motivating concern here, however,
is the phenomenon we named and identified—the use and abuse of the
sovereign shield in commercial contexts. This phenomenon profoundly
threatens consumers. We accordingly direct our attention to exempting
commercial activity from the sovereign shield regardless of the actor. Doing so
will go a long way toward preserving a fairer balance of power between the
federal government and the states, the executive and the legislative branches,
and consumers and corporations.

private actor engages in state action, it may be subject to limitations that would apply
were the government to engage in the action itself.
135. See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 415 (arguing that the Court “seems to have abandoned the
quest for an adequate definition of public function”).
136. See infra note 222.
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1.

Sue-and-be-sued clauses

Sue-and-be-sued clauses, and the doctrine surrounding them, provide a
useful starting point for drawing a viable distinction between commercial and
noncommercial activity.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the United States
government from suit without its affirmative consent.137 This general
protection also applies to units of the United States government, including
federal administrative agencies138 and government-owned corporations.139
When providing affirmative consent to suit, lawmakers set the extent and
circumstances of consent via statute.140 Legislation can broadly waive the
United States’ sovereign immunity with regard to a specific subject matter or
may apply to a number of federal agencies and entities.141
Congress can also include a provision waiving sovereign immunity for an
individual federal agency or government-owned corporation in the statute
that creates the entity.142 This statutory provision—known as a sue-and-besued clause—governs the extent to which a particular entity may be subject to
suit.143 Unlike the narrow construction applied to legislative waivers of
sovereign immunity for specific subjects,144 courts liberally construe sue-andbe-sued clauses.145
In the absence of express restrictions, sue-and-be-sued clauses are generally
taken to “embrace all civil process incident to the commencement or
continuance of legal proceedings.”146 In Federal Housing Administration v. Burr,
137. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988).
138. Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940).
139. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 473-75; Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 554-56.
140. See, e.g., Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967).
141. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the United States’ sovereign

142.

143.
144.
145.

146.

immunity with respect to certain types of tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United
States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,
but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”).
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (stating that the TVA “[m]ay sue and be sued in its corporate
name”); 39 U.S.C. § 401(1) (authorizing the USPS “to sue and be sued in its official
name”).
Burr, 309 U.S. at 245.
See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990).
See Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 139 S. Ct. 1435, 1441 (2019); Burr, 309 U.S. at 245
(“[W]aivers by Congress of governmental immunity in [the] case of such federal
instrumentalities should be liberally construed. This policy is in line with the current
disfavor of the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit . . . .”).
Franchise Tax Bd. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 518 (1984) (quoting Burr, 309 U.S. at
245).
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the Court identified implied restrictions that can also bar suit. The Court held
that an entity cannot be sued upon a clear showing that (1) the specific type of
suit is inconsistent with the statutory scheme or the Constitution; (2) the suit
would cause “grave interference” with the performance of a governmental
function; or (3) Congress plainly intended a narrow application of the
particular sue-and-be-sued clause.147 Without a sufficient showing of an
express or implied restriction, sue-and-be-sued clauses are presumed to waive
sovereign immunity.148
In Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Supreme Court had to
determine the implications of the TVA’s sue-and-be-sued clause.149 In doing so
it distinguished between “commercial” activities and “governmental
functions,”150 suggesting that this conceptual distinction is both viable and
productive.
In Thacker, a boater was injured and his passenger killed when the boat
struck a downed power line in the Tennessee River.151 The boater-petitioner
sued the TVA, whose employees had been in the process of raising the downed
line after it fell into the water.152 The TVA moved to dismiss the petitioner’s
claim of negligence, asserting sovereign immunity.153 The Eleventh Circuit
found that the TVA was entitled to immunity from suit for discretionary
functions that were part of either its commercial or its governmental
activities.154 The Supreme Court reversed, separating commercial activities
from governmental functions.155 The Court held that, in the absence of special
constitutional or statutory prohibitions, governmental entities whose enabling
legislation includes a sue-and-be-sued clause are subject to suit to the same
extent as their private competitors, provided that such governmental entities
are engaged in commercial activities.156

147. Burr, 309 U.S. at 245.
148. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1994); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554-55
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

155.
156.

(1988).
139 S. Ct. at 1438-40.
Id. at 1439 (recognizing that “the TVA is something of a hybrid, combining
traditionally governmental functions with typically commercial ones”).
Id. at 1440.
Id.
Id.
See id. Although the TVA is explicitly exempt from the FTCA, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(l ),
the Eleventh Circuit referred to the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception in
analyzing the case. See Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 868 F.3d 979, 981-82 (11th Cir.
2017) (per curiam), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1435.
Thacker, 139 S. Ct. at 1443-44.
Id. at 1443.
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The Court in Thacker rejected the TVA’s assertion that it should not
distinguish between commercial and governmental actions157:
[T]he Government overreaches when it says that all suits based on the TVA’s
discretionary conduct will “grave[ly] interfere[]” with “governmental function[s].”
That is so, at the least, because the discretionary acts of hybrid entities like the
TVA may be not governmental but commercial in nature. And a suit challenging
a commercial act will not “grave[ly]”—or, indeed, at all—interfere with the
“governmental functions” Burr cared about protecting.158

In defining commercial activities, the Court focused on activities that were also
performed by private corporations.159 The Court cited the TVA’s production
and sale of electricity, noting that Con Edison and Dominion Energy
performed the same activities.160 The Court stated that “[w]hatever their
ownership structures, the [TVA and the private utilities] do basically the same
things to deliver power to customers.”161 The Court went on to characterize
the TVA’s commercial conduct as “the kind of thing any power company
might do.”162 In contrast, the Court noted that the TVA’s power of eminent
domain is not a commercial activity because that power is “reserved to
sovereign actors.”163
The jurisprudence around sue-and-be-sued clauses thus both recognizes a
distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities and identifies
factors (such as private competition, business transactions with the public, and
matters covered by local policies) that aid in recognizing commercial activities.

157. Id. at 1441-42 (citing Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940); and FDIC v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 482 (1994)).
158. Id. at 1442 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Burr, 309 U.S. at 245).
159. Id. at 1442-43; see also Burr, 309 U.S. at 244-47 (recognizing that Congress intended the

160.
161.
162.
163.

Federal Housing Administration to “engage in commercial and business transactions
with the public” and noting that activities “reflect[ing] purely local policies” should not
generally fall within the exceptions to a sue-and-be-sued clause); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 518, 524-25 (1984) (recognizing that because Congress had
“launched” the USPS “into the commercial world,” it should “be treated similarly to
other self-sustaining commercial ventures” (quoting Burr, 309 U.S. at 245));
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 83 (1941) (“While [the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation] acts as a governmental agency in performing its
functions, still its transactions are akin to those of private enterprises and the mere fact
that it is an agency of the government does not extend to it the immunity of the
sovereign.” (citation omitted)).
Thacker, 139 S. Ct. at 1439.
Id. at 1443-44.
Id. at 1444.
Id. at 1439, 1444.
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2.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) provides foreign
governments and their instrumentalities a general grant of immunity from the
jurisdiction of both federal and state courts in the United States,164 with a
limited number of express exceptions.165 When an exception applies, a foreign
government may be sued in a United States court and be held “liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”166 Immunity is tied to the type of activity in which the foreign
entity engages: The FSIA provides immunity to foreign governments only for
their sovereign acts, not for their commercial activities.167
The FSIA permits suits “based upon” (1) a foreign government’s
commercial activities that occurred in the United States; (2) “an act performed
in the United States in connection with” a foreign government’s commercial
activities abroad; or (3) an act carried out abroad in connection to a foreign
government’s commercial activity outside the United States, provided that the
act has a “direct effect in the United States.”168 Collectively, these bases for
denying immunity are known as the “commercial” exception and have been
deemed the “most significant of the FSIA’s exceptions” by the Supreme
Court.169 Indeed, the main rationale behind the exception was that the
increasing prevalence of foreign governments’ commercial activities required

164. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.);

165.

166.

167.
168.
169.

28 U.S.C. § 1604. Foreign sovereign immunity has deep common law roots. See, e.g.,
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 117 (1812) (statement of the
case); id. at 146-47 (majority opinion) (holding that the Exchange, a formerly Americanflagged ship seized on the orders of Napoleon, was an instrumentality of the French
Empire and exempt from the jurisdiction of United States courts). Initially the United
States followed the “classical theory” and granted foreign governments “ ‘virtually
absolute’ immunity as a matter of international grace and comity.” Jam v. Int’l Fin.
Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 766 (2019); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 486 (1983) (discussing the United States’ long-standing adherence to the classical
theory).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605; see also Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 766. The FSIA exceptions provide the sole
basis to subject a foreign government to the jurisdiction of a United States court. See
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-35 (1989).
28 U.S.C. § 1606. While the FSIA provides that a foreign government subject to an
exception is liable to the same extent as a similarly situated private party, different
standards apply for wrongful-death and punitive-damage claims. Id.; see also Verlinden,
461 U.S. at 488-89, 489 n.12.
See Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 766.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
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“persons doing business with [foreign governments] to have their rights
determined in the courts.”170
The definition of “commercial” in the FSIA statute provides little specific
guidance.171 But we know that a commercial activity can consist of a series of
acts or an individual act, and that “[t]he commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature [of the activity] . . . rather than
by reference to its purpose.”172 In other words, courts should ignore the motive
or objective of a foreign government’s actions, focusing instead on the nature of
the actions.
To determine whether a foreign government’s activity is commercial,
courts examine “whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs
(whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private
party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’”173 In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,
for example, a U.S. couple sued the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi hospital,
and the hospital’s purchasing agent in the United States for injuries that Scott
Nelson sustained during detention by the Saudi government.174 The Nelsons
alleged that Scott was recruited in the United States to be an engineer in the
Saudi hospital.175 According to the complaint, Nelson was arrested for raising
safety concerns at the hospital and was subsequently beaten and tortured by
the Saudi government.176 The Supreme Court found that the challenged act,
the detention, was not “based upon” the commercial activity as required by the
FSIA.177 Importantly, although the Court noted that the recruitment and
170. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 766 (quoting Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of

171.

172.
173.

174.
175.
176.
177.

State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in DEP’T ST.
BULL., June 1952, at 984, 985).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (“A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”); see
also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1993) (“If this is a definition, it is one
distinguished only by its diffidence; . . . it ‘leaves the critical term “commercial” largely
undefined.’ ” (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 612)).
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (quoting Commercial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990));
see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (noting that when a state engages in commercial activity it
“exercise[s] only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens”).
See 507 U.S. at 351-54.
Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 356-58 (“The only reasonable reading of the [phrase ‘based upon a commercial
activity’] calls for something more than a mere connection with, or relation to,
commercial activity.”).
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employment activities were “arguably commercial,” it found that those
activities did not form the basis of the suit.178
As part of its discussion, the Court in Nelson endeavored to define
“commercial” and focused on activities that “can also be exercised by private
citizens.”179 It clarified that a commercial activity is one that the sovereign
undertakes “‘in the manner of a private player within’ the market.”180 The
Court distinguished commercial activity from the “[e]xercise of the powers of
police and penal officers,” the latter of which can be performed only by a
sovereign.181
The Court’s analysis in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., is also
instructive. There, the Court found that Argentina’s default on bonds issued to
stabilize its currency was subject to the commercial exception of the FSIA.182
The Court classified as commercial “a foreign government [that] acts, not as
regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it.”183 The
goal of the activity was not dispositive: “[T]he question is not whether the
foreign government is acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of
fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives.”184 Instead, the Court drew a
distinction between Argentina’s regulatory authority—which was not a
commercial activity because it could not be undertaken by a private party—
and a “contract to buy army boots or even bullets,” which it categorized as “a
‘commercial’ activity, because private companies can similarly use sales
contracts to acquire goods.”185 The Court found that the issuance of bonds
constituted a commercial activity, asserting that the bonds were “in almost all
respects garden-variety debt instruments” that offered a future income stream
and could be held by private parties and traded on international markets.186
Taken together, the jurisprudence around the FSIA both recognizes a
distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities and defines
“commercial” to include actions that could be and are undertaken by a private
entity or corporation.

178. Id. at 358.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 358-61 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
Id. at 360 (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614).
Id. at 361-62.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 609, 620.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id. at 614-15.
Id. at 615. The Court noted further that “[e]ngaging in a commercial act does not require
the receipt of fair value, or even compliance with the common-law requirements of
consideration.” Id. at 616.
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3.

The market-participant exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause

The Commerce Clause vests in Congress the authority to regulate
interstate commerce.187 But Congress does not regulate every aspect of
interstate commerce, and in many instances state and municipal actions that
affect interstate commerce are not directly prohibited by federal regulation.188
The Commerce Clause, however, has long been held to limit the power of
states and municipalities to prevent them from discriminating against
interstate commerce.189 This extension of the Commerce Clause, known as the
Dormant Commerce Clause, works to prevent states and municipalities from
taking regulatory action that aids in-state commercial participants and
burdens out-of-state competitors.190 A state or municipal action can be
challenged on the basis that it either discriminates against interstate
commerce191 or imposes a burden on interstate commerce out of proportion to
the benefits intended by the locality.192
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges, however, are limited to the
regulatory actions of states and municipalities.193 State and municipal actions
may favor in-state commercial participants over out-of-state competition—
despite affecting interstate commerce—when the state or municipality acts as a
market participant rather than as a regulator.194 The Court has noted that

187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate

Commerce . . . among the several States.”).
188. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803-04, 809-10 (1976) (stating

189.

190.
191.

192.
193.
194.

that Maryland’s scrap program had an effect on interstate commerce but was not
barred by federal law).
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988); Welton v. Missouri, 91
U.S. 275, 282 (1876) (stating that congressional inaction on interstate commerce is
“equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and
untrammelled”).
Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (2008); New Energy, 486 U.S. at 273-74.
See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461 (2019); Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (“ ‘[D]iscrimination’
simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter.”).
Davis, 553 U.S. at 338-39.
Id. at 337-39.
See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-10 (1976) (holding that a
Maryland state scrap program that favored domestic participants was not barred by
the Dormant Commerce Clause where Maryland participated in the market as a
buyer). As Jon Michaels put it, “restructuring a program or initiative as commercial
may . . . allow states and localities to skirt the Dormant Commerce Clause.” Michaels,
supra note 62, at 533-34. This exception exists because the purpose of the Dormant
Commerce Clause is to prohibit state and municipal actions that restrain interstate
footnote continued on next page
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“[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in
the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”195 This marketparticipant exception dictates that where a state or municipality engages in the
same types of activities as a private market participant, it is free from scrutiny
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.196
The Court announced the market-participant doctrine in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., in which it determined that the State of Maryland was
acting as a market participant when it created a program that subsidized local
scrap processors by paying for Maryland-titled junk cars that were converted
into scrap.197 The Court explained that Maryland had not “sought to prohibit
the flow of [junk cars], or to regulate the conditions under which [that flow]
may occur.”198 Such action would be market regulation. Rather, Maryland had

195.
196.

197.

198.

commerce, not to prohibit states and municipalities from engaging in interstate
commerce themselves. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980).
Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810 (footnote omitted).
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439. Similarly, in the application of state tort law, many jurisdictions
have adopted the public-duty doctrine, which protects states and municipalities from
individual tort liability where the duty is owed to the public rather than to specific
individuals. See, e.g., McGaughey v. District of Columbia, 734 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C.
2010) (interpreting District of Columbia law), aff ’d, 684 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Ostwalt v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 614 F. Supp. 2d 603, 607 (W.D.N.C.
2008) (interpreting North Carolina law); Bassett v. Lamantia, 858 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th
Cir. 2017) (interpreting Montana law), certifying questions to 417 P.3d 299 (Mont. 2018).
The origin of the public-duty doctrine can be traced to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
South v. Maryland ex rel. Pottle, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 401, 403 (1856), where the Court
held that state officials may not be held liable for failure to protect individual citizens
from criminal conduct. Certain jurisdictions have explicitly excepted government
conduct from the public-duty doctrine’s liability refuge where similar conduct
undertaken by a private person would result in liability. See, e.g., Kent v. City of
Columbia Falls, 350 P.3d 9, 16-17 (Mont. 2015) (discussing Montana law); Catone v.
Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 333 (R.I. 1989) (applying Rhode Island law). In the State of
Washington, courts have held that “[t]he public duty doctrine does not apply where the
government is performing a proprietary function.” Dorsch v. City of Tacoma, 960 P.2d
489, 491 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). Other jurisdictions, however, have eschewed the publicduty doctrine, finding that its application has “resulted in an artificial distinction
between so-called ‘public’ and ‘private’ duties.” Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308,
314 (Mich. 2001) (recognizing that both the Florida and Arizona Supreme Courts have
rejected the public-duty doctrine). This exposition of the public-duty doctrine both
supports the logic underlying the market-participant exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause and reveals the practical difficulty in distinguishing between public
and private actors. It is partly for this reason that our proposed solution offers courts a
totality-of-the-circumstances test for the commercial–noncommercial distinction
rather than relying on a single criterion.
426 U.S. at 796-97, 806-10. Maryland created this program in an effort to solve its
abandoned-automobile problem; the program aimed to raise scrapping profits and
speed up the “scrap cycle.” Id. at 796-97.
Id. at 806.
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entered the market itself to bid up the cars’ prices “as a purchaser, in effect, of a
potential article of interstate commerce.”199 Thus, Maryland was acting as a
market participant and its program was not subject to the limitations of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.200 Another example can be drawn from two
Supreme Court cases: Where a state creates a public monopoly for trash
processing it is acting as a market participant exempt from the Dormant
Commerce Clause,201 but where a state regulates to create a private monopoly
for trash processing, it is acting as a market regulator subject to the Dormant
Commerce Clause.202
Although the Dormant Commerce Clause cases use the term “market
participant” rather than “commercial participant,” the contours are similar,
and therefore useful, for our purposes.203 To determine whether a state or
municipality is acting as a regulator—a state actor—or as a market participant,
courts consider whether the activity is the kind of activity that private market
participants undertake.204 The Ninth Circuit recently specified some, though
not all, of the questions it used to identify conduct constituting market
199. Id. at 806, 808.
200. Id.; see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440 (holding that South Dakota was acting as a “market

participant” in selling cement).
201. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334-

36, 345 (2007).
202. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387, 392-95 (1994).
203. The Court previously attempted to grapple with the significance of a state engaging in
commercial conduct, but the effort foundered. In 1964, a majority of the Court
determined that Alabama, acting as a railroad operator, had waived its sovereign
immunity under a federal law providing for liability to employees injured while
working for a railroad. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S.
184, 184-86, 194, 196 (1964) overruled by Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987), and Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). The Court reasoned that the state had implicitly
consented to the application of this federal law when it chose to enter the railroad
business and that providing for immunity would undermine congressional power to
regulate an important industry. Id. at 196. But little more than two decades later, the
Court overruled Parden “to the extent that [it] is inconsistent with the requirement that
an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in
unmistakably clear language.” Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 (plurality opinion). And little more
than a decade after that, the Court demolished whatever might have been left of
Parden’s reasoning, overruling the remainder of the case and stating that “a State’s
express waiver of sovereign immunity [must] be unequivocal.” Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
at 680. Because of this vociferous repudiation of Parden we address the case only in this
footnote, but it is worth noting for two reasons. First, the line of decisions addressed
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, not federal sovereign immunity, which is our
primary focus. Second, the analysis in Parden offers an example of the Court’s capacity
to distinguish between governmental actions that are sovereign or commercial in
character.
204. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439.
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participation: whether the activity is proprietary, whether the activity can be
“analogized” to that of a private entity, whether the activity does not impose
restrictions that “reach beyond the immediate parties with which the
government transacts business,” and whether the government entity “is subject
to market pressures and conditions.”205 Therefore, when California acted in a
manner similar to a private insurer, and when no one was required to insure
themselves or seek reimbursement from the state, the state acted as a market
participant, not as a regulator.206
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence thus recognizes that a
government entity—a state—may have dual roles: as a commercial actor and as
a government regulator. A state is treated differently when it acts in a
commercial manner than when it acts in a regulatory manner. The Dormant
Commerce Clause applies only in the latter case.
B. A New Protocol
Recognizing that courts can distinguish between commercial and
noncommercial activities and borrowing from the factors courts previously
have used to identify commercial conduct, this Subpart sets out the Article’s
primary contribution: the theory and protocol for applying our doctrinal
proposal. We begin not with an abstract definition of “commercial,” but
instead with the factors used by courts in other contexts to identify the
contours of commercial conduct. Thus, our protocol offers a series of factors
that courts can consider in determining whether a particular activity is
commercial, but it does not impose a rigid, bright-line test.
Finding a path out of the sovereign-shield morass requires correcting the
underlying question: Rather than focusing on who the actor is, courts should
focus on the nature of the action. If the challenged conduct is commercial, it
should not be covered by sovereign-shield defenses regardless of the actor. If,
by contrast, the challenged conduct is not commercial, there should be a
presumption that sovereign-shield defenses are available for governmentdirected conduct. In both cases, traditional agency principles remain sufficient
to allocate liability between the government and the contractor. Therefore, we
propose that courts use our recommended protocol to limit the application of
sovereign-shield defenses for commercial conduct.

205. Asante v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Care Servs., 886 F.3d 795, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2018) (first

quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); and then quoting
Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 1992)).
206. Id. at 801-02; see also Mason & Dixon Lines Inc. v. Steudle, 683 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir.
2012) (discussing the market-participant exception in the context of a roadconstruction program).
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Our protocol poses four basic questions; it can easily be visualized as a
decision tree. And it answers a singular, all-important question: Does an
injured party have an avenue for redress?
1.

Did Congress unambiguously preempt state law or provide
immunity for the challenged conduct?

Congress can preempt state law or provide immunity to a federal agency,
to a federal instrumentality, or for specific conduct.207 Our proposal does not
alter that right; it only requires that lawmakers state their intentions
clearly.208 Therefore, the first question is whether Congress unambiguously
preempted state law or provided immunity for the challenged conduct. To
meet that burden, the party asserting the sovereign shield would need to
clearly establish express preemption, field preemption, the impossibility of
compliance with both federal and state law, or an explicit congressional grant
of immunity. If Congress explicitly and expressly defined the bounds of
preemption or immunity in a given area by statute, the sovereign shield should
apply regardless of whether the government is acting directly or through a
contractor.209 Otherwise, the sovereign shield ought not apply at this stage of
the protocol.
Preemption doctrine has multiple branches, some more compelling than
others.210 Implicit preemption, for example, takes two forms: field preemption,
207. See, e.g., Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2010)

(describing federal preemption); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S.
381, 388-89 (1939) (discussing express grants of immunity).
208. Cf. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 265 (“By requiring Congress to speak clearly
in order to preempt state law, [the presumption against preemption] ensures notice to
legislative advocates of state interest that preemption is contemplated in proposed
legislation, and it imposes an additional procedural hurdle to legislation that
undermines state prerogatives. Like other ‘clear statement rules’ disfavoring legislation
that alters the federal-state balance, the . . . presumption operationalizes the political
and procedural safeguards of federalism.” (footnotes omitted)).
209. There is always the risk that the legislature could act to protect contractors by statute,
but this risk persists, in light of the Supremacy Clause, regardless of the doctrinal
reforms we propose. For further discussion of this risk, see note 107 above.
210. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231 (2000) (arguing that “constitutional
law has no place for the Court’s fuzzier notions of ‘obstacle’ preemption, under which
state law is preempted whenever its practical effects would stand in the way of
accomplishing the full purposes behind a valid federal statute”); see also Barnett Bank of
Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (“More often, explicit pre-emption
language does not appear, or does not directly answer the question. In that event,
courts must consider whether the federal statute’s ‘structure and purpose,’ or
nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive
intent.” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
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where federal law so dominates an area that it precludes state action, as in the
context of immigration law,211 and conflict preemption, where state law and
federal law are in tension.212 Conflict preemption occurs when either (1) a
party can show that simultaneous compliance with both state law and federal
law is impossible, or (2) a reviewing court concludes that a “challenged state
law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”213 Conflict preemption can thus
alternatively be impossibility or obstacle preemption. The latter, obstacle
preemption, permits what we and others view as problematically subjective
assessments of whether state law hinders federal policy.214 Consequently, the
murky notion of obstacle preemption would be unavailable as an answer to
our first question. Accordingly, only a showing of express preemption, field
preemption, or impossibility preemption would afford congressionally created
preemptive effect under our protocol.
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) provides a concrete example for
analysis of the first question in our protocol. Federal law expressly preempts
state disclosure requirements that might otherwise apply to “[l]oans made,
insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by title IV” of the
HEA.215 Adopting our protocol, nothing changes in the analysis of express
preemption; Congress retains the authority to expressly and explicitly
preempt state law or regulation. Accordingly, if conduct is challenged as a
violation of a state-mandated disclosure requirement, that requirement would
be preempted by federal law. Suits under state law could not continue.216 In
turn, if the challenged conduct is not related to a state-mandated disclosure
requirement, then a reviewing court would continue through the protocol to
assess whether the conduct is commercial, the question that we turn to next.217
211. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (finding that Congress has “occupied

the field of alien registration”).
Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 981-82.
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 3, at 35-43.
20 U.S.C. § 1098g.
Of course, there will be disputes about what is covered even by express preemptive
language. Compare, e.g., Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims were expressly preempted by federal law),
with Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 647-50 (7th Cir. 2019)
(distinguishing Chae and finding that similar claims were not entirely preempted).
Such diversity is to be expected in any legal scheme, and it also provides an incentive
for Congress to be more explicit in its preemption and immunity preferences.
217. It bears emphasis that this treatment of explicit preemption would in some cases leave
the outcome substantively unchanged. Consider Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, a case
that we explored in our prior work. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1023-24,
1023 nn.277-79. The case involved a claim by student-loan borrowers arguing, among
other things, that a federal contractor managing their loans used “statements and
footnote continued on next page
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
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2.

Is the challenged conduct commercial?

The second question in the protocol asks whether the challenged conduct
is commercial. Although “commercial” has not been explicitly defined in the
context of preemption and immunity, it has been explored in other areas, as
discussed above.218 To identify factors indicating that an activity is
commercial, we draw on doctrines interpreting sue-and-be-sued-clauses, the
scope of immunity afforded to foreign governments under the FSIA, and the
market-participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.219 From
these sources we distill four inquiries that courts should consider when
determining whether challenged conduct is commercial:
(1) Do private-sector actors offer the service or product in competition
with the federal government or its contractor?
(2) Do individual consumers engage in direct transactions with the
provider of the relevant service or product?220
(3) Does a state or federal consumer-protection regulatory regime apply
to similar transactions not involving the government?
(4) Would the good or service be provided but for federal intervention?
We do not suggest that these inquiries make up a rigid test, nor that every
factor need be present to render conduct commercial. Rather, we think courts
should consider these factors together and holistically; the more of these
questions are answered in the affirmative, the stronger the case that the
activity should be classified as commercial. Further, and borrowing from the
FSIA, our definition of “commercial” should be “determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by

coupon books that trick[ed] borrowers” into believing that interest did not vary based
on the date of payment, in violation of California consumer-protection laws. Chae, 593
F.3d at 940-942. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sallie Mae, the
defendant, and on appeal a Ninth Circuit panel concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims
were preempted by the HEA. Id. at 938. The panel considered the following language:
“Loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title IV of
the Higher Education Act . . . shall not be subject to any disclosure requirements of any
State law.” Id. at 942 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1098g). The panel
concluded that the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims actually alleged improper
disclosures (as opposed to, for example, affirmative misrepresentations) and were
consequently preempted. Id. at 942-43. Because the panel’s reasoning turned on explicit
statutory language, application of our protocol would likely not change the result.
218. See supra Part III.A.
219. See supra Part III.A.
220. When we say consumers here, we refer specifically to end-use consumers. So while
uranium-enrichment facilities might sell to power plants, for example, those facilities
do not engage directly with consumers for our purposes. See infra Part III.D.3.
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reference to its purpose.”221 A decisionmaker should ask whether the
challenged conduct is commercial with reference to the four questions
identified above, not whether the motivation for the conduct was commercial,
in determining how to treat the conduct under our protocol.222
If a court determines that the challenged conduct is commercial, then the
sovereign shield should not attach regardless of whether the government is
providing the service or product directly or through an instrumentality or
contractor. If, however, a court determines that the challenged conduct is not
commercial in nature, then the government actor is entitled to a presumption
that the sovereign shield protects it from liability to the extent that federal law
otherwise permits.223 If the government is acting indirectly through a
contractor, the contractor would likewise enjoy a presumption that the
sovereign shield protects it as an agent of the government, again to the extent
that the law permits224 and provided that the contractor has acted in
accordance with the government’s instructions and guidance.
3.

Who engaged in the challenged conduct?

Question three is whether the federal actor directly engaged in the
challenged conduct or acted indirectly through a contractor or instrumentality.
If the federal government acted by itself and not through an intermediary,
then the response to question two (whether the challenged conduct was
commercial) remains dispositive in assigning liability. If the federal
government acted by itself and the conduct was not commercial, the plaintiff’s
suit is subject to sovereign-shield defenses. If, by contrast, the federal
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
222. We recognize that this protocol omits from oversight and liability conduct that may

be particularly troubling, such as human and civil rights violations in private prisons
and immigration detention centers operated by private contractors. One could imagine
a range of abuses in these settings that would not be deemed commercial when assessed
using our four questions. Consider, for example, the physical abuse of a prisoner. By
definition, carceral services can be provided only by or on behalf of the government, so
private-sector actors do not offer the service or product in competition with the
government. For the same reason, there are no consumer-protection regimes for
carceral services that do not involve the government. Nor would the good or service be
provided but for government intervention. So even though the contractor interacts
directly with the “consumer” (here a federal prisoner), on balance a court would likely
find the conduct noncommercial. This is not to say that we condone such actions or
that the perpetrators should not be brought to justice and the victims compensated. It
is only to say that such activities fall outside the scope of this Article, which focuses on
harms to consumers.
223. See infra Part III.B.4 (describing four different scenarios and their related liability under
our proposal).
224. See infra Part III.B.4. We explore how this presumption might operate in the
noncommercial context in another article. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 3.
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government acted itself and the conduct was commercial, then the plaintiff’s
suit may proceed under relevant state or federal law.
If, however, the government acted indirectly, a court must proceed to the
fourth and final question in order to properly distribute liability, regardless of
whether or not the challenged conduct was deemed commercial.
4.

If the actor is not the government, who is liable under traditional
agency law principles?

In general, when an agent commits a tort, the agent is liable for the
resulting harm.225 A principal may also be vicariously liable for a tort caused
by its agent, provided that the agent acted within the scope of the principal–
agent relationship and the “principal control[led] or ha[d] the right to control
the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work.”226 If these
conditions are met, both the agent and the principal may be subject to suit and
liable for damages under the principle of respondeat superior.227 This means, for
example, that if a contractor follows its employer’s lawful instructions and
causes harm,228 the employer is also properly a defendant in a lawsuit by a
victim. Another way to think about this is that once agency is established,
liability may flow upstream from the agent to the principal.229
This does not answer the question whether a government agent is
protected by preemption, sovereign immunity, or intergovernmental
immunity. Under our proposal, when faced with the question whether the
225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006). Liability can be precluded

226.
227.
228.

229.

by the operation of law. For example, the FTCA “bar[s] actions against governmental
employees for acts within the scope of their employment or require[s] that the
government be substituted as the defendant.” Id. § 7.01 cmt. b.
Id. § 7.07.
Id. § 2.04.
This matters greatly in the apportionment of liability. It is long settled and well
established that if a contractor deviates from the terms of a contract and causes harm,
this militates in favor of finding the contractor alone liable. See Mechs.’ Bank of
Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 326, 337-38 (1820) (explaining that a
principal’s liability for acts undertaken by a general agent depends on whether the acts
were done in the exercise of the agent’s duties to the principal and within the limits of
the powers delegated).
A principal generally has a duty to indemnify its agent “when the agent suffers a loss
that fairly should be borne by the principal in light of their relationship.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14(2)(b). However, a “principal’s duty to
indemnify does not extend to losses that result from the agent’s own negligence, illegal
acts, or other wrongful conduct.” Id. § 8.14 cmt. b. The fact that an agent followed its
government principal’s instructions in causing harm would strongly support an
argument for indemnification. Of course, a duty to indemnify may also arise by
contract. Id. We apply these principles in both downstream (inverted) agency analysis
and upstream agency analysis.
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sovereign shield should apply to a government agent, the analysis remains the
same, but its effect is different. A court asks whether an agency relationship
exists and, if so, whether the agent was acting within the scope of that
relationship and under the direction of the principal.230 But the result does not
determine upstream liability. Instead, the result determines whether the
benefits of sovereignty inherent in the principal—the sovereign shield—flow
downstream to the agent.231 We have previously termed this an “inverted
agency analysis,”232 where “[t]he court looks at the relationship to determine
whether attributes of the principal extend downward to protect the agent that
caused the harm.”233
Whether an agency relationship exists and whether the agent is
appropriately acting within the scope of that relationship matter for two
different reasons, one having to do with apportioning liability and the other
having to do with the applicability of the sovereign shield. Under our protocol,
if the challenged conduct is commercial, agency principles determine whether
the government is liable alongside its contractor; neither principal nor agent
enjoy protection. If the challenged conduct is not commercial and the principal
is protected by the sovereign shield, agency principles determine whether the
contractor/agent may be protected alongside the government/principal.234
Assume that a consumer brings a claim against both a government
contractor and the federal government for violating a state consumer statute.
The liability of the contractor/agent or the government/principal for the
challenged conduct depends on two questions addressed as part of our protocol:
Was the challenged conduct commercial? And would the application of
traditional agency principles result in joint liability? We addressed the
mechanism for determining the first question above.235
230. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
231. This is precisely the intuition drawn upon by the Court in Boyle v. United Technologies

232.
233.
234.

235.

Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988), which recognized that “[i]t makes little sense to insulate
the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of
military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself,
but not when it contracts for the production.”
Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 1007.
Id.
We recognize, of course, that traditional principal–agent negotiations come along
with this proposal. The government might propose a narrow agency agreement to
reduce its liability risk, and the contractor will likely seek a broader agency
relationship to compel the government to share liability (or protection). We expect
that these dynamics might change the details of contracts, but they would presumably
arise during negotiations between two sophisticated parties. Either way, if the conduct
is commercial, an injured consumer will not be foreclosed from seeking a remedy from
one (if not both) actors.
See supra Part III.B.2.
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The second question—whether agency principles, when applied, would
result in joint liability—is a well-trodden legal path236 and depends on the facts
of each case. A court must determine whether a principal–agent relationship
existed between the government and the contractor. The contractor can be
expected to argue that the alleged harm was caused by conduct undertaken
within the scope of the agency relationship. In other words, the contractor will
likely argue that it was following the direct and specific instructions of the
principal when the called-for activity resulted in harm. The defendant
contractor’s argument is stronger when it can marshal more evidence that the
government both ordered the specific activity that caused the harm and
specified in great detail how that activity should be conducted.237 Conversely,
if the contractor had discretion in deciding how to complete the challenged
conduct, acted in an area not covered by the government’s specific instructions,
or violated the government’s instructions, then the contractor is less likely to
persuade a court that it acted as an agent.238
Our protocol for determining agency applies these principles of agency
law in both downstream (inverted) agency analysis and upstream agency
analysis. When we ask whether the conduct was commercial and whether
traditional agency principles would result in joint liability, there are four
possible outcomes:
(1) The challenged action was commercial, and the application of agency
principles would result in joint liability. In that scenario the sovereign
shield would not be available, and both the contractor/agent and the
government/principal may be found liable.
(2) The challenged action was commercial, but the application of agency
principles would not result in joint liability.239 In that scenario only
the contractor/agent may be found liable, and the government would
not be liable.
(3) The challenged action was not commercial, and the application of
agency principles would result in joint liability. In that scenario both
236. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.01, 7.07 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
237. This is so because the tighter the connection between the harm and the principal’s

instruction to the agent, the stronger the argument becomes that the principal
controlled the manner and means of the agent’s work. See supra notes 226-29 and
accompanying text.
238. This was the analysis undertaken in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18
(1940), the seminal case on derivative sovereign immunity. In its analysis of derivative
sovereign immunity, Yearsley drew heavily on agency principles. See id. at 20-21
(explaining that agent liability had been found where the agent “exceeded his
authority” or the authority “was not validly conferred”).
239. In other words, the plaintiff could not establish a principal–agent relationship or the
agent was operating outside the scope of that relationship.
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the contractor/agent and the government/principal enjoy a
presumption that the sovereign shield provides protection. This is the
only scenario in which the sovereign shield could protect both the government
and its contractor.
(4) The challenged action was not commercial, and the application of
agency principles would not result in joint liability.240 In that scenario
the contractor/agent, but not the government/principal, may be
found liable.
We represent this analysis below:
Joint liability
under agency law
Commercial
conduct
Noncommercial
conduct

No joint liability
under agency law

Contractor agent may be liable
Contractor may be liable
Government principal may be liable
Sovereign shield applies

Contractor may be liable

Under current doctrine, without a move to our protocol, the federal
government enjoys sovereign-shield protection regardless of the facts, and
contractors enjoy it whenever the application of a five-factor framework
determines that outcome.241 But, as we have shown, courts do not always apply
all of the five factors and sometimes apply factors inconsistently.242 We have
also shown how contractors and their agency partners seek to manipulate
doctrinal complexity to extend the sovereign shield and shrink available
remedies for consumers.243 As a result, consumers are often entirely precluded
from recovery.
Our proposal may still result in the frustration of a plaintiff seeking to
recover if the challenged action is not commercial and the actor is either the
240. In this situation the contractor may have, for example, deviated from instructions of

the principal. See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21.
241. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 1, at 994-95 (identifying five factors—congressional

intent, the character of the contracted institution and its contract, the discretion of the
contractor, the contractor’s adherence to the precise terms of the contract, and the
actual or potential impact of state regulation on federal policymaking and
decisionmaking—that courts have used to analyze sovereign-shield defenses asserted
by nongovernmental actors).
242. See id. at 994-1010.
243. Id. at 1032-34, 1038-41.
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federal government or an agent acting on its behalf, following careful and
lawful instructions. Our future work will explore this quadrant of the diagram
in more detail.244 But in the context of consumer protection, where a grant of
immunity constitutes a potential federal trespass on traditional state police
powers, we suggest that this proposal properly balances the need of the
government to act as sovereign245 with the need to afford injured consumers
the possibility of redress when the government is not acting in its uniquely
sovereign capacity.
In emphasizing the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
conduct, we have drawn on lessons learned from scholars of federal–state
relations, business–regulator relations, and business–consumer relations.
Centering our protocol on whether an activity is commercial in nature avoids
a murkier and less certain phenomenon: the potentially shifting relationships
between states and the federal government that complicate efforts to draw a
consistent line between state and federal authority.246 Because both states and
the federal government may engage in commercial conduct, this focus also
ensures that the private sector—which plays a role in shaping and
manipulating federal–state relationships—remains a visible subject of judicial
analysis.247 Our approach obviates the need to attempt, likely unsuccessfully,
to address the wide range of ways in which businesses influence decisions,
policymaking, and oversight at the federal agencies that employ and regulate
them.248 And by preserving the possibility of state-law liability for both
contractors and the federal government when the government acts
commercially, our protocol also preserves states’ traditional police powers and
the role of states as checks not only on the federal government but also on the
private sector.249 Finally, as the concentration of private-sector power
increases, our protocol creates pathways to accountability and liability and

244. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 3.
245. This need is consistent with the purposes of immunity and preemption: to pursue

246.
247.
248.
249.

public ends, avoid timidity in public service, recruit talented government employees,
and prevent the distraction and cost of damages suits. See Sabatino, supra note 108, at
197-201 (describing sovereign immunity’s objectives and rationales); see also Florey,
supra note 103, at 771-82 (describing the history and development of sovereign
immunity).
See supra Part II.A (describing the intricacies of federal–state relationships).
See supra Part II.A (noting the private sector’s capacity to act like a black hole, invisibly
affecting state and federal actions and interactions).
See supra Part II.B (describing the difficulty of preventing informal ties between
regulators and their regulated entities that can inhibit regulation in the public interest).
See supra Part II.B (identifying the important role that states play in holding
contractors and the federal government accountable).
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preserves the possibility of redress for those harmed by contractor conduct.250
Our protocol thus attempts to stabilize the balance between players in multiple
dimensions of potential conflict—between states and the federal government,
between the branches of the federal government, and between businesses and
consumers.
C. Returning to First Principles
As shown above, courts and Congress know how to differentiate between
commercial and noncommercial activities, even when those activities involve
government agents and instrumentalities.251 Recognizing commercial activity
is therefore possible. This Article’s proposal is bold in that it extends a
commercial analysis to federal actors themselves. But it is not as extreme as it
may seem at first glance. In fact, this protocol returns to a principle from early
constitutional cases that determined liability based on the nature of the
activities an entity performed rather than the status of the entity itself. 252 In
those early cases, the Supreme Court recognized, explicitly or implicitly, that
the same entity—including federal instrumentalities and sovereign states—can
perform different functions with different legal consequences. Our proposal
would restore and extend that mode of analysis.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, which held that Congress has the power to
incorporate a national bank and that states could not constitutionally tax its
branches, the Supreme Court recognized that states cannot regulate or
discriminate against the federal government.253 About fifty years later,
however, in National Bank v. Kentucky, the Court clarified that states could tax
shares of the National Bank held by private persons, even when the tax was
collected from the bank itself.254 Although the lines between taxable and
nontaxable items have since blurred, comparing McCulloch and National Bank
offers a window into the possibility of assessing liability based on the action
rather than the actor. In 1819, the Court in McCulloch recognized the difference
later elaborated in National Bank:
250. See supra Part II.C (describing the accumulation of wealth and power in the private

sector and discussing the importance of accountability).
251. See supra Part III.A.
252. It also harkens back to the early understanding (or lack thereof) of federal sovereign

immunity. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 524 (“[S]overeign immunity rules have never
barred all suits against government officers, or all forms of relief that operate against
the government. The doctrine of sovereign immunity as it initially developed in this
country had a much more constrained meaning.”).
253. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425, 436 (1819); see also Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 859-68 (1824) (reaffirming the holding of McCulloch).
254. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361-63 (1870).
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This opinion . . . does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in
common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on
the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in
common with other property of the same description throughout the State.255

The Court’s holding in National Bank accordingly acknowledged that when a
federal instrumentality trades in the private economy, intergovernmentalimmunity defenses might not apply.
In 1869, in Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, the Court rejected the Pacific
Railroad’s position that its road, which was “constructed under the direction
and authority of Congress, for the uses and purposes of the United States,” was
exempt from state taxation pursuant to McCulloch.256 Because Congress did not
explicitly exempt the road from state taxation, the Court drew a line between
the “means employed by the government,” which could be exempt from state
taxation under McCulloch, and the “property of agents employed by the
government,” which the Court held was presumably not exempt.257 The Court
was particularly concerned, from a federalism perspective, about a slippery
slope:
[Exempting the road] would remove from the reach of State taxation all the
property of every agent of the government. Every corporation engaged in the
transportation of mails, or of government property of any description, by land or
water, or in supplying materials for the use of the government, or in performing
any service of whatever kind, might claim the benefit of the exemption. The
amount of property now held by such corporations, and having relations more or
less direct to the National government and its service, is very great. And this
amount is continually increasing; so that it may admit of question whether the
whole income of the property which will remain liable to State taxation, if the
principle contended for is admitted and applied in its fullest extent, may not
ultimately be found inadequate to the support of the State governments.258

Thus the Supreme Court distinguished commercial and noncommercial
activity, even within government and government instrumentalities. In fact,
five years after McCulloch, the Supreme Court decided in Bank of the United
States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia that a state’s ownership interest in a business
did not confer special Eleventh Amendment protections.259 Referring to
federal sovereign immunity,260 the Court in Planters’ Bank stated:
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
Thomson v. Pac. R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 587-88, 592 (1870).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 591-92.
See Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 906-08 (1824); see
also Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 325-26 (1837) (applying the same
reasoning as Planters’ Bank). But see Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,
397-99 (1995) (considering the very different role of Amtrak, a corporation created by
the government “for the furtherance of governmental objectives,” where the
footnote continued on next page
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It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in
any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a
level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which
belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.261

Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Planters’ Bank—that the government qua
government sits in a different position than the government qua corporation—
affords yet another example of a court analyzing liability based on the activity
of an entity rather than on the entity’s general status.
The analysis in Planters’ Bank is not an anomaly. The Supreme Court
differentiated between the State of Georgia’s power of eminent domain in its
own state (an “attribute of sovereignty”) and Georgia’s land ownership in
Tennessee (a commercial activity) in one case,262 and between the sovereign’s
right to recover public money for public purposes (a governmental
undertaking, like collecting taxes) and the sovereign’s contract or tort rights as
a corporate shareholder (a commercial action) in another.263 As the Court
explained in the context of taxation, the effect of the action, not the status of
the actor, is dispositive:
[E]xemption of Federal agencies from state taxation is dependent, not upon the
nature of the agents, or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that
they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether
the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were
intended to serve it, or does hinder the efficient exercise of their power.264

260.
261.
262.

263.

264.

government did “not merely hold[] some shares but control[led] the . . . corporation
through its appointees”).
See Planters’ Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 908.
Id. at 907.
Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480-81 (1924) (holding that the
“sovereignty of Georgia was not extended into Tennessee,” that Georgia’s “enterprise in
Tennessee is a private undertaking,” and that because Georgia “occupies the same
position [in Tennessee] as does a private corporation authorized to own and operate a
railroad[,] . . . it cannot claim sovereign privilege or immunity”).
Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 126 (1919) (distinguishing
instances in which the government acts in its “governmental capacity” from those
instances in which it “assert[s] any rights with respect to the conduct of [a]
corporation’s affairs, its contracts or its torts”).
Cent. Pac. R.R. Co. v. California, 162 U.S. 91, 119-20 (1896) (quoting R.R. Co. v. Peniston,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5, 36 (1873)). At some point, the task of separating commercial from
governmental—at least in the federalism context—morphed into a debate around the
difference between traditional and nontraditional governmental functions. In 1985, the
Court found that “the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in
terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only unworkable but is also
inconsistent with established principles of federalism.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
footnote continued on next page
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The distinction between commercial and noncommercial government
activities has received notice in more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, too,
though in the context of state-conferred sovereign immunity. In a dissent from
a decision holding that the operator of a state’s prepaid-tuition program
enjoyed immunity from accusations that it had violated federal law by
engaging in false and misleading advertising,265 Justice Stevens suggested that
it may be “appropriate to limit the coverage of state sovereign immunity by
treating the commercial enterprises of the States like the commercial activities
of foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.”266
Indeed.
D. Applying the Protocol: Bright Lines and Grey Areas
In this Subpart, we offer brief illustrations of how this Article’s proposed
protocol might be applied, drawing on the primary facts of cases we discussed
in The Sovereign Shield and referred to in this Article’s Introduction. Each case
involves federal contractors and instrumentalities because, as of this writing,
those are the cases that have been litigated. In the first example, however, we
show how our analytical protocol would apply if the government were
offering services directly. In offering these illustrations, we emphasize that the
questions we suggest are just guidance for the courts. We do not contend that
one or more of these questions is dispositive; context matters. Some facts will
create more difficulty for courts in determining whether a particular activity
is commercial. But application of the protocol reduces the risk that a person
harmed by the commercial conduct of a government actor or contractor will
have no remedy.

U.S. 833 (1976)). This unworkability problem is an issue that scholars have articulated
forcefully. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 21, at 899 (arguing that the “state actor
designation [sh]ould . . . turn on an actor’s tools, responsibilities, and outlook rather
than on what uniform she wears or whether she happens to be closely supervised by a
government official”); see also Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the
Structural Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 507-12 (2011) (calling for
recognition of a “constitutional continuum” along which an entity and its functions
could be assessed from more governmental to more private). It is for this reason that a
return to the principles of National Bank and Planters’ Bank—tying liability to the
activity rather than the type of entity—makes sense. See supra notes 254, 259 and
accompanying text.
265. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 671, 691
(1999).
266. Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1.

Student Loan Servicing Alliance v. District of Columbia

Student-loan servicers challenged an effort by the District of Columbia to
impose a licensing scheme on entities servicing federally owned and
guaranteed loans held by District residents.267 The servicers, supported by the
federal government, argued that federal law preempted these regulatory
efforts by the District.268 They also asserted that the District’s regulatory
scheme violated intergovernmental-immunity principles.269 The district court
produced a confusing opinion that appears to have been an attempt to reach a
practical compromise rather than an attempt to engage in reasoned analysis of
the proper extent of the sovereign shield.270
Had our protocol been in place, the court first would have asked whether
Congress expressly preempted the District’s regulatory effort.271 The parties
focused on one provision of federal law, 20 U.S.C. § 1098g, which excludes
“[l]oans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by
Title IV of the [HEA] . . . [from] any disclosure requirements of any State
law.”272 The trial court concluded that this language did not preclude state
(here, District) regulation requiring servicers to submit information to obtain a
license.273 This satisfies the first question in the protocol: Congress did not
unequivocally preempt the District’s legislation.
The next question would be whether the activity engaged in by the
servicer was commercial. Under our protocol, the court would ask a series of
sub-questions. Do other private-sector actors offer the product or service? To
answer that, a court would need to define the relevant product or service. Here,
either party might argue that the relevant product is narrower or broader,
adjusting their definition to increase their relative chance of success. The
activity, though, is loan servicing,274 and as a practical matter, other private267. Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2018).
268. Id. at 36, 46.
269. Id. at 72-73.
270. See id. at 75-76. The trial court partially granted the plaintiff ’s motion for summary

271.
272.
273.
274.

judgment on the ground that the District’s licensing requirement posed an “obstacle” to
the objective of federal legislation—but only with respect to two categories of federal
student loans. Id. at 59, 61-72. Ultimately, the case was settled. See Student Loan
Servicing All. v. Taylor, No. 19-7001, 2019 WL 2158372, *1 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2019)
(dismissing the appeal based on an unopposed motion for voluntary dismissal).
See supra Part III.B.1.
Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (second alteration in original) (quoting
20 U.S.C. § 1098g).
Id. at 53-54.
What that means more specifically may be subject to dispute and would be up to the
court to resolve. A plaintiff would have the initial opportunity to define the activity to
be evaluated, a defendant could contest this definition, and the court would have to
exercise some degree of judgment. Some cases would likely present close calls.
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sector actors service loans (including student loans) and do compete with the
federal government. Second, do individual consumers deal directly with the
service provider? Yes, servicers deal directly with consumers—the
borrowers.275 Third, does a state or federal consumer-protection regulatory
regime apply to similar transactions? On these facts the question is more
slippery, because the District created a licensing program specifically for
student-loan servicers. It is nevertheless clear that both the District and the
federal government regulate the servicing of credit, at least under each
government’s laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices.276
Finally, would the good or service be provided in the absence of federal
intervention? The answer is yes: Were federal student loans not available
under the HEA, student loans would still be available and serviced by private
companies. This combination of facts would lead the court to classify studentloan servicers as providing a commercial service.
Once the conduct is classified as commercial, the court would move to the
third question in the protocol: Who engaged in the challenged conduct? The
servicers, under contract with the Department of Education, engaged in the
challenged conduct.
This would take the court to the final question, invoking agency law: How
would liability be apportioned between government/principal and
contractor/agent? Under traditional liability principles, the servicers would be
liable for the harm they caused in violation of applicable law. Here, because the
case involved servicers challenging the District and not a consumer attempting
to sue the servicers, the question of vicarious liability for the Department of
Education would not arise. But had a consumer sued the servicers, the
protocol’s implication would be clear: The Department of Education would be
liable alongside its agent contractors, unless the Department could show that
the contractors either violated the Department’s instructions or acted beyond
the scope of their contracts when they caused harm.
And what if the federal government itself serviced student loans? In late
2019, then–Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos proposed exactly that.277
275. Indeed, evidence of misconduct by servicers in dealing with borrowers prompted the

District of Columbia to implement its licensing regime. Student Loan Servicing All., 351
F. Supp. 3d at 40-41.
276. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 28-3904(r) (2021); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). As a peripheral matter that
might be compelling to the court, federal legislation regulates servicing in the homemortgage context under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 26012617. And federal laws and regulations do provide consumer protections in the specific
context of student-loan servicing, as the Student Loan Servicing Alliance litigation itself
showed. See 351 F. Supp. 3d at 39-40.
277. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos Shares Vision for a Better, Stronger
Federal Student Aid at Annual Training Conference (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/Y888-DCGF.
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Applying our protocol, the analysis would be exactly the same if the
government itself serviced the loans and violated either state or federal law. In
that scenario, the injured borrower should be able to sue the new government
entity without being blocked by sovereign-shield defenses because the conduct
was commercial.
2.

Scott v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

In this case, the plaintiffs were jurors who claimed that the bank providing
debit cards to compensate them for jury duty had “provided them with
misleading information about those cards, structured the debit card program so
as to prevent them from receiving their full compensation, and charged them
outrageous fees for using that compensation.”278 The bank, J.P. Morgan Chase
& Co., argued that because it provided the debit cards pursuant to a contractual
relationship with the Department of the Treasury, it enjoyed derivative
sovereign immunity.279 The court determined that the plaintiffs’ complaint did
not advance “allegations that, on their own, at this juncture, would defeat
Defendant’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity,”280 but because factual
questions remained, it did not grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.281
Turning to our protocol, the first question does not apply because the
defendant did not assert federal preemption or an express grant of immunity.
Next, we ask if the provision of debit cards is a commercial activity. Consistent
with our proposal, this question sidesteps the purpose or motive behind the
provision of the cards: It does not matter that the debit cards were used to
compensate jurors. Do other, private businesses offer debit cards? Certainly.
Are these transactions conducted directly with individual consumers? Yes. Do
existing consumer-protection legislative or regulatory regimes apply to
provision of debit cards? Yes.282 Further, debit cards would be provided by
other private entities regardless (and independent) of the federal program used
to facilitate compensation for jurors.283 These facts suggest that the activity is
commercial. J.P. Morgan Chase, a federal contractor, is the actor whose
278. Scott v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 296 F. Supp. 3d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2017).
279. Id. at 104-05. The bank made additional arguments in support of its motion to dismiss,

280.
281.
282.
283.

including plaintiffs’ failure to join the Department of the Treasury as a necessary party,
id. at 104, but those arguments are not relevant to our analysis.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 235 (2020) (implementing standards for debit card transaction fees).
Although the trial court explicitly recognized J.P. Morgan Chase as the Department of
the Treasury’s “financial agent” pursuant to the contract between the two, id. at 102,
that does not change the nature of the service J.P. Morgan Chase was providing as
described in the complaint, see id.
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conduct allegedly caused harm. Applying basic agency principles, J.P. Morgan
Chase would be liable, and so would the Department of the Treasury,284 unless
the Department could show that the bank either violated its instructions or
caused harm in the exercise of its discretion.285
3.

Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.

Neighbors of a uranium-enrichment facility owned by the government and
operated by a private management company filed suit after finding evidence of
contamination on their property.286 The defendants asserted all of the sovereignshield defenses: derivative sovereign immunity, intergovernmental immunity,
and preemption.287 Martin Marietta Energy Systems, the company operating the
facility, moved for summary judgment based on its identity as a government
contractor.288 The court determined that Martin Marietta could take advantage
of the sovereign shield, but that it had not provided sufficient evidence in its
summary judgment filing to establish, without factual dispute, that the
Department of Energy gave specific instructions that the contractor followed.289
If analyzed under the protocol outlined above, the reviewing court would
first investigate the possibility of unambiguous federal preemption or explicit
immunization. In this case there are federal laws specific to the work
performed by contractors,290 but the court did not discuss any laws governing
the question of liability.291 Nor was there any indication of an explicit grant of
immunity by Congress.
The next concern is immediately knotty: Is the production of enriched
uranium a commercial activity? A court would turn to our proposed sub284. Or, more precisely, the District of Columbia. The relationship is somewhat more

285.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

complicated because the jurors were residents of and performed their service in the
District of Columbia, and the Department of the Treasury had extended its debit card
program (for federal agencies) to the District. Id.
The trial court concluded that it did not have the evidence necessary to resolve these
issues. Id. at 108. But of course, the court raised the issues for purposes of an inverted
agency analysis.
Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 960-61 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
Id. at 962.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 966-68.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2061(b).
Instead, the trial court looked for implied preemption of state law by “federal common
law.” Lamb, 835 F. Supp. at 965 (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504
(1988)). “Under this . . . theory, federal law pre-empts state law where (1) the action
involves a uniquely federal interest; and (2) . . . ‘a “significant conflict” exists between an
identifiable “federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,” . . . or the
application of state law would “frustrate specific objectives” of federal legislation.’ ” Id.
(third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507).
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questions for guidance. Do other private businesses operate nuclear production
facilities? Yes, although it is possible that all do so on behalf of the federal
government.292 Do these facilities deal with consumers directly? No. Do
existing state or federal legislative or regulatory regimes apply to the
production of enriched uranium? The plaintiffs cited no such regimes in their
claim.293 In the absence of federal intervention, would the activity be
performed? Management companies would still operate, but it is less clear that
they would operate nuclear facilities like this one because these facilities are
owned by the federal government. This presents a close call, but, on balance,
producing enriched uranium is likely not a commercial activity. This is true
even though, at a higher level of generality, operating a federal facility likely is
a commercial activity.
The entity causing harm was the facility operator, which moves the
analysis to the agency relationship between the government and the
contractor. Because the challenged activity is likely noncommercial, the
federal government, at least, may take advantage of the sovereign-shield
doctrines. The contractor may also be able to call upon these doctrines in
reliance on the inverted agency analysis discussed above. Therefore, provided
that (1) the contractor complied with the terms of its contract; (2) those terms
were lawful; and (3) the specific conduct causing harm was not undertaken by
the contractor in the exercise of its discretion, the contractor would also be
presumptively protected by the sovereign shield.
The court in this case denied summary judgment to the defendants because
they failed to prove the above conditions in their motion.294 Although the trial
court viewed these facts as significant for purposes of implicit preemption via
the government-contractor defense, similar facts would be relevant to the
agency analysis in the final step of our protocol. The agent’s compliance with
the principal’s orders matters in determining whether the contractor can be
liable for harm caused in the course of noncommercial activity on behalf of the
sovereign.
* * *
Setting aside constitutional constraints on federal action, there is no way
to predict what industry the national government may see fit to enter. Nor is
there a way to predict, given the vagaries of national politics, whether the
government would choose to operate at the retail level itself or through a
292. See id. at 960.
293. Instead, the plaintiffs alleged ordinary negligence, strict liability based on the

abnormally dangerous activities at the plant, private nuisance, and gross negligence. Id.
at 961. Complicating matters, a state effort to protect the local environment around a
federal facility might itself lead to a battle over preemption.
294. Id. at 966-68.
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contractor. Either choice—whether to enter and how to enter—may affect the
analysis above. This is also not an issue that is unique to a particular
administration or political party. The issues raised with respect to student-loan
servicers, for example, have occurred mainly during a Republican, ostensibly
pro–small government administration. But one could imagine a Democratic
administration expanding the federal government’s reach with respect to any
number of industries (health care, transportation and infrastructure, energy,
and so on). Scholars295 and policymakers,296 for example, have suggested that
the USPS should offer banking services, which would increase the
government’s share of a traditionally private market. The USPS is a boundary
organization between public and private industry,297 meaning that sovereignshield defenses would likely be raised should patrons or consumers assert a
violation of their rights. A court, taking a careful look at the facts of each case,
should be able to apply our protocol in those situations to determine whether a
consumer has access to a remedy and, if so, who is subject to liability.
Conclusion
The ever-increasing quantity and variety of activities performed by the
federal government, directly and indirectly, has enabled government
contractors to exploit special privileges of the sovereign: They can evade
oversight as well as accountability under state and federal law. Consequently,
working for the federal government can present less litigation risk to a
business than performing the same work independently or for a private entity.
But this benefit to the private sector is only the narrowest conception of the
consequences of greater outsourcing. The exploitation of the sovereign shield
results in a shift in the balance of power between the federal government and
the states at the expense of the latter; between the legislative branch and the
executive branch in favor of the latter; and between business and consumers in
favor of the former.
In this Article we have outlined a doctrinal response to private businesses’
exploitation of the sovereign shield. Our key proposal requires shifting courts’
attention away from the identity of the actor seeking sovereign-shield
protections and its relationship with the federal government. Instead, we
suggest that courts should center their inquiry on whether the challenged
activity is commercial. We provide a set of questions that judges should
295. See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION,

THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 200-03, 210-13 (2015) (proposing a return to postal
banking).
296. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Big Benefits of Postal Service Banking, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (July 7, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/AQ4V-A3P9.
297. See O’Connell, supra note 122, at 844-45.
AND THE
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consider in determining whether a particular activity is commercial. In
developing our proposal, we have drawn on other doctrinal areas where courts
have successfully separated commercial from noncommercial conduct and
returned to early Supreme Court opinions for guidance. Importantly, we have
also drawn on the insights of scholars in adjacent (but separate) areas of law,
including constitutional law, administrative law, and consumer law. This
multidisciplinary approach is essential to developing a solution to the
sovereign-shield phenomenon, which in the past has slipped through the gaps
between these areas of scholarship. This Article’s proposal would clarify
jurisprudence that is currently confused, allow more injured consumers to
recover, and contribute to rebalancing the relationships between states and the
federal government, among the branches of the federal government, and
between businesses and consumers.
The doctrinal reform proposed in this Article does not eliminate reasons
for concern about the pace, scale, and scope of federal outsourcing. But it does
respond to the ways in which different doctrines interact to threaten both
individual consumers and the states. Our solution draws on the conviction of a
previous era that the sovereign may engage in commerce, but that when it does
so it may lose the perquisites of sovereignty.
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